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THE SUPREME COURT 
2017 TERM 
FOREWORD:  
RIGHTS AS TRUMPS? 
Jamal Greene∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
ights are more than mere interests, but they are not absolute.  And  
 so two competing frames have emerged for adjudicating conflicts 
over rights.  Under the first frame, rights are absolute but for the excep-
tional circumstances in which they may be limited.  Constitutional ad-
judication within this frame is primarily an interpretive exercise fixed 
on identifying the substance and reach of any constitutional rights at 
issue.  Under the second frame, rights are limited but for the exceptional 
circumstances in which they are absolute.  Adjudication within this 
frame is primarily an empirical exercise fixed on testing the govern-
ment’s justification for its action.  In one frame, the paradigm cases of 
rights infringement arise as the consequences of governing poorly.  In 
the other, the paradigm cases arise as the costs of governing well. 
The first frame describes the approach of the U.S. Supreme Court 
over roughly the last half century.  The second frame describes the ap-
proach of the rest of the developed world over the same period.  Neither 
frame is perfect; many of their flaws track the inherent limits of judicial 
review in a democracy.  The two frames might indeed produce similar 
results in particular cases.  But across time and space, the choice of 
frame has profound consequences for constitutional law and for its sub-
jects.  In particular, the first frame, the one that dominates U.S. courts, 
has special pathologies that ill prepare its practitioners to referee the 
paradigmatic conflicts of a modern, pluralistic political order. 
To wit, two men, Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins, wanted a cake 
for their wedding.1  They visited a bakery, Masterpiece Cakeshop, in 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗  Dwight Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  For helpful comments and criticism, I thank 
Jessie Allen, Akhil Reed Amar, Nicholas Bagley, Randy Barnett, Seyla Benhabib, Evan Bernick, 
Deborah Brake, Samuel Issacharoff, Vicki Jackson, Jeremy Kessler, Suzanne Kim, Gillian Metzger, 
Henry Monaghan, David Pozen, Jedediah Purdy, Jack Rakove, Russell Robinson, Fred Schauer, 
Sarah Seo, Reva Siegel, Yvonne Tew, students at the Georgetown Advanced Constitutional Law 
symposium, participants at workshops at Columbia Law School and the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law, and the editors of the Harvard Law Review.  I owe special thanks to Katherine Yon 
Ebright, Michael Lemanski, Zach Piaker, Swara Saraiya, and Sophie Schuit for indispensable re-
search assistance. 
 1 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018). 
R
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Lakewood, Colorado, where they were told by the owner and chef, Jack 
Phillips, that his Christian religious beliefs prevented him from baking 
custom cakes for same-sex weddings.2  Discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation violates Colorado’s public accommodation law,3 and 
Craig and Mullins sued to require that the law be enforced against  
Phillips.4  Phillips answered that, for him, designing cakes was a form 
of artistic expression, and so requiring him to do so for a same-sex wed-
ding violated his constitutional rights not just to freedom of religion but 
to freedom of speech as well.5 
In the artistic spirit, consider two portraits of the dispute that became 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.6  
Within one frame we observe a dispute among friends, citizens who 
share a core set of values but who are quibbling — vigorously, to be 
sure — over how those values apply to a particular set of facts.  That 
core includes the view that art is a protected form of expression that the 
state may not compel an artist to produce against his will.7  What’s 
more, conditioning Phillips’s ability to operate a bakery on the state’s 
controlling the content of his art would count, prima facie, as a forbid-
den compulsion.8  Both sides likewise agree that a free speech defense 
would not permit Phillips to refuse to sell cakes to Craig and Mullins 
simply because they are gay men.9  Phillips’s argument was not 
grounded in a generalized right of association or autonomy that would 
allow him to engage consensually with whomever he chooses and on 
whatever terms.  His was a subtler claim, a pinpoint in the canvas, and 
the couple’s rebuttal was equally so.  Phillips has his rights, so do Craig 
and Mullins, and, crucially, so do the people of the State of Colorado in 
whose name its public accommodation law speaks.  This is a portrait of 
rights on all sides, reconcilable only at retail, if at all. 
Within the other frame rests a darker portrait, a legal Guernica clut-
tered with slippery slopes, law school hypotheticals, and assorted horri-
bles on parade.  At oral argument, Justice Gorsuch asked David Cole, 
representing the couple for the ACLU, whether the Colorado law would 
require a baker to sell a cake with a cross on it to a member of the Ku 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 Id.  
 3 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2)(a) (2017). 
 4 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1725. 
 5 Id. at 1726. 
 6 138 S. Ct. 1719.  
 7 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 63, 78, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-
111), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-111_f314.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y4HB-ZM6M]. 
 8 See id. at 78. 
 9 See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 14, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111); 
Brief for Respondents Charlie Craig and David Mullins at 2–3, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (No. 16-111); Brief for Respondent Colorado Civil Rights Commission at 3, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111). 
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Klux Klan.10  Justice Alito asked the State’s Solicitor General whether 
the law could force the baker to provide a cake honoring the anniversary 
of Kristallnacht.11  Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan both compared 
Masterpiece Cakeshop to Ollie’s Barbecue, the “whites only” Alabama 
restaurant that challenged the public accommodation provisions of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.12  One does not align another with Nazis and 
segregationists to be friendly or subtle.  Rather, these pathological cases 
signal the outlandishness of the position they are recruited to support.13  
This is a portrait of rights on one side, bad faith on the other, and pow-
erful disagreement about which is which.  This conflict is reconcilable 
only at wholesale, and without mercy to the loser. 
This categorical, zero-sum frame reflects a noble instinct.  Professor 
Ronald Dworkin gave the most articulate expression to the idea that 
rights are best conceived as “trumps.”14  Dworkin argued that to subject 
rights to balancing against the public good is to deny them altogether.15  
But one consequence of rarely subjecting rights to balancing is that the 
rights themselves must be articulated with care and specificity.  The line 
demarcating those who hold rights and those who do not becomes a 
momentous one that merits the attention of lawmakers, citizens, and 
adjudicators.  Dworkin emphasized that, inasmuch as it is concerned 
with rights, the Constitution’s attention should be rewarding; it follows 
that its attention must likewise be precious. 
This frame creates many problems for constitutional law.  For one 
thing, it is ill-equipped to address the core conflicts that populate the 
constitutional dockets of U.S. courts.  Within a mature rights culture, 
the typical cases that reach deep into the appellate courts and up to the 
Supreme Court do not arise from the wholesale denials of citizenship 
that preoccupied Dworkin but rather from workaday acts of governance 
from which individuals seek retail exemption: a zealous licensing 
scheme, a questionable automobile search or dog sniff, a novel or an-
noying time, place, or manner restriction on speech or gun possession.  
The paradigm cases that might once have been thought to justify judi-
cial review — racial segregation, McCarthyism, and the like — are no 
longer paradigmatic, if they ever were. 
Less momentous cases sit uneasily within a rights-as-trumps frame.  
The frame induces our identification of rights to track the categories 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 10 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 87.  
 11 Id. at 70. 
 12 Id. at 18–19, 37; see also Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296–98 (1964) (describing the 
discriminatory practice at Ollie’s Barbecue). 
 13 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 462 (1985) (defining “pathologies” to which Blasi argues First Amendment doctrine ought 
to respond). 
 14 See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1977). 
 15 Id. at 192. 
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judges are able to access, articulate, and delimit rather than the moral, 
political, or even constitutional justice the rights mean to promote.  And 
so Americans have a right to market pharmaceuticals to doctors16 or to 
parlay the corporate form into electioneering expenditures,17 both of 
which the Court categorizes as “speech,”18 but no federal constitutional 
right to food, shelter, or education, which are harder to corral.  The 
Court’s two major partisan gerrymandering cases this Term model the 
constitutional distortion rights as trumps produces.  Judges fear holding 
that they can adjudicate partisan gerrymandering claims not because 
such claims are fallacious or frivolous — most members of the Court 
seem to agree that partisan gerrymandering is antidemocratic — but ra-
ther because such claims are intuitive and inviting. 
The tension between judges’ intuitions about justice and their un-
derstandings of the bounds of inherited categories leads to a second 
problem: typically tacit (and therefore baffling) distortions of the cate-
gories themselves.  We all have our favorite examples of the Court pre-
tending to apply rational basis review but instead applying a heightened 
form of scrutiny,19 or vice versa.20  When an ex ante choice of category 
largely determines the ex post decision, manipulation of that choice is to 
be expected: to deny a rights claim within this framework is to say the 
right does not exist.21  And so these cases do not reflect lawlessness tout 
court, a standard accusation,22 so much as a breakdown in legal form, 
not so unlike resort to equity to surmount the limits of common law 
pleading.  Still, lack of transparency about the basis for decision is a 
rule-of-law problem that the rights-as-trump frame invites. 
A third problem has been less recognized but might be most damag-
ing.  The costs of the rights-as-trumps frame extend beyond substantive 
constitutional justice and legal form and into a relational register.  Con-
stitutional law is not just a set of foundational rules and standards that 
govern the structure of the constituted government and the behavior of 
its actors.  It is also a style of — a grammar for — political argument.23  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). 
 17 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339–40 (2010). 
 18 Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552; Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310. 
 19 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–35 (1996); id. at 640–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 447–50 (1985); id. at 456 (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227–30 
(1982); id. at 244 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
 20 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher II), 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208, 2211–14 (2016); 
id. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327–43 (2003); id. at 350 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 21 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies — And Their 
Connections to Substantive Rights, 92 VA. L. REV. 633, 635–37 (2006). 
 22 See, e.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 481–84 (2004). 
 23 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 5–6 (1982); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, 
Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1771, 1782–84 (1994). 
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Every case begins, by Article III hypothesis, as a narrow one between 
adversaries.24  A legal claim socializes their enmity and, by submitting 
it to public scrutiny, generalizes it as well.  Forcing rights into prefabri-
cated modules flattens litigants’ gazes and encourages them to tie each 
other to the most pathological case.  Because the rights-as-trumps frame 
cannot accommodate conflicts of rights, it forces us to deny that our 
opponents have them.  When rights are trumps, they favor rhetoric over 
judgment, simplicity over context, homogeneity over diversity.  The 
frame requires us to formulate constitutional politics as a battle between 
those who are of constitutional concern and those who are not.  It coars-
ens us, and by leaving us farther apart at the end of a dispute than we 
were at the beginning, it diminishes us.25 
It is sometimes said that a special, if not unique, feature of U.S. con-
stitutional law is that it constitutes us, not just as a nation, but as a 
people as well.26  Ours is not an ethno-national or religious project but 
a political one, dedicated to the audacious idea that liberalism and plu-
ralism are mutually constituted.  Needless to say, it has not always been 
so.  The early history of the United States required reconciling an un-
precedented commitment to liberty for and equality among whites with 
an equally impressive commitment to chattel slavery for Africans and 
their descendants and domination of indigenous people.27  The civil 
rights movement coincided with a rights explosion that has challenged 
the movement’s priority of place within the constitutional culture.  The 
paradigmatic rights conflict of the twenty-first century has involved 
multiple principles that must be jointly maximized or else selectively 
abandoned.  Respect for the nation’s complexity requires that rights 
recognition be a jurisgenerative rather than a jurispathic process.  Our 
rights culture cannot constitute us unless all rights count, and all rights 
cannot count if all rights are absolute. 
This Foreword charts a path forward.  The claim that the rights-as-
trumps, or categorical, frame describes U.S. constitutional law will en-
counter resistance, and so Part II defines the terms of reference and 
makes the positive case for fitting the Court’s jurisprudence into those 
terms.  The U.S. Supreme Court balances pervasively, and what cate-
gories it maintains are riddled with exceptions.  What is distinctive 
about the American position, and what aligns it with Dworkin, comes 
into view only in comparison to the dominant alternative: proportion- 
ality.  Categoricalism and proportionality reflect different orientations 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 25 See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIS-
COURSE 14 (1991). 
 26 See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 5 (2005). 
 27 See AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 5–7 (2010); Patrick Wolfe, 
Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native, 8 J. GENOCIDE RES. 387, 394 (2006). 
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toward what Professors Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat describe as 
the dyad of legal authority versus legal justification.28  Whether balanc-
ing is viewed as exceptional or instead as inherent in the task of rights 
adjudication affects the constitutional imagination in ways that the 
Term’s rights cases make vivid. 
What follows from the U.S. approach to constitutional adjudication 
forms the subject of Part III.  Categorical adjudication is rule-like in its 
orientation, and rules by their nature distort the underlying norm they 
are designed to implement.  The frame deprives constitutional deci-
sionmakers of the resources necessary to adjudicate conflicts of rights, 
as in abortion, affirmative action, or religious exemption cases, and ob-
scures the constitutional dimension of governmental interests, which de-
rive from a constitutionally protected right of political participation.  
The benefit of rule-like decisional norms lies in the promise of transpar-
ency and predictability, but in a society in which rights claims are both 
ubiquitous and reasonable, this benefit turns out to be elusive.  We dis-
agree — reasonably — about the rights that we have,29 and so a cate-
gorical frame burdens the categories with more pressure than they can 
bear.  The result is the worst of both worlds: a dogmatic but capricious 
devotion to categorical rules. 
To be sure, that this state of affairs is problematic does not mean 
remedies avail themselves, but the Court’s approach is less autochtho-
nous than we might suppose.  Part IV corrects the common but mis-
placed view that conceiving of rights as trumps is some kind of  
American birthright or is baked into U.S. constitutional arrangements.  
It is true that the U.S. Constitution does not typically attach limitations 
clauses to rights, but that fact neither explains the emergence of the U.S. 
approach nor justifies its continuation.  Proportionality analysis is more 
congenial to the way the lawyers and statesmen of the Founding gener-
ation understood rights than the presumptive absolutism that charac-
terizes the modern frame.  That frame is rather an artifact of the second 
half of the twentieth century, when U.S. constitutional lawyers con-
structed the categorical frame as a way of reconciling the post-Lochner30 
regime of deference to government actors with the unique place of race 
in the American constitutional order.  Countries whose constitutional 
courts lack the historical baggage and the inherited doctrinal architec-
ture of the U.S. Supreme Court have structured their adjudicative 
frameworks to match the fecundity of modern rights claims. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 28 See MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL CULTURE 111–12 (2013); see also Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. ON HUM. RTS. 31 (1994). 
 29 See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 12 (1999). 
 30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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Part V applies the Foreword’s insights to some of the Term’s First 
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and partisan gerrymandering cases, 
with special reference to the lessons of foreign experience in these areas.  
The constitutional jurisprudence of other countries is of course peculiar 
to their own histories, constitutional structures, and institutional  
arrangements.  But the considered views of foreign legal experts con-
fronting similar problems and drawing on analogous conceptual frames 
nonetheless have some power to persuade, if lacking power to control.31 
The Court views freedom of speech as a classic trump, inviting a 
good lawyer to formulate a state requirement to bake a cake for a same-
sex wedding,32 to pay union dues,33 to give women accurate information 
about available health services,34 or even to engage in partisan gerry-
mandering as speech infringements.35  The tidiness of a speech frame 
pulled the Court into the case, but Masterpiece Cakeshop was never re-
ally about freedom of expression.  What made Phillips’s claim constitu-
tionally interesting was not that he bakes especially awesome cakes but 
rather that his motivation for refusing to make one for Craig and  
Mullins was grounded in his religious beliefs.  A “disparate impact” free-
dom of religion claim was off the table in the case because the Court — 
fearing the need for balancing — had declared such claims to be beneath 
constitutional concern.36  Other jurisdictions handle religious discrimi-
nation claims with subtler instruments. 
Unlike the apparently absolute language of the First Amendment — 
“Congress shall make no law”37 — the Fourth Amendment’s text seems 
to invite an adjudicator precisely to evaluate the reasonableness of a 
search at retail, on a case-by-case basis.38  And yet, because most 
searches must be conducted pursuant to warrants supported by  
probable cause, the weight of analysis in many Fourth Amendment 
cases resembles an ontological inquiry into the nature of a search.39  The 
resulting doctrinal Byzantium requires the Court’s constant care, as 
rules built against the limits of human attention and cognition are jerry-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 31 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITU-
TIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 71–72 (2010). 
 32 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1728 (2018). 
 33 Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2462 (2018). 
 34 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2368–70 (2018). 
 35 See Brief for Appellees at 36, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161); see also 
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934, 1937–38 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 36 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882–83 (1990).  Phillips’s claim of intentional religious 
discrimination remained in the case and eventually proved decisive.  See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
138 S. Ct at 1730–31. 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 38 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 
(1994). 
 39 See id. at 762–85; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. 
L. REV. 349, 358–60 (1974). 
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rigged onto panoptic digital technology, omniscient DNA evidence, and 
countless other unforeseen circumstances.  Carpenter v. United States40 
well illustrates the costs of sidelining reasonableness as the Fourth 
Amendment’s über-value. 
In partisan gerrymandering cases, the Court has searched in vain for 
a categorical frame to save it from the social science needed to assess the 
effects of a politically biased districting map.41  At oral argument, Chief 
Justice Roberts referred to the statistical evidence offered to resolve such 
cases as “sociological gobbledygook.”42  The rights-as-trumps frame 
takes as a premise that judges are better suited to resolve interpretive 
disagreement over the stylized content of the law rather than empirical 
uncertainty about facts in the world.  Along with the Court’s decision 
upholding the President’s ban on travel from a set of mostly Muslim-
majority countries,43 the gerrymandering cases show how the categori-
cal frame’s fixation on policing the borders of political authority can 
deny the protection of rights at just the point when protection is most 
urgent. 
More broadly, the partisan gerrymandering cases offer a poignant 
example of what can be gained in reimagining the relationship between 
constitutional law and constitutional politics.  Professor William 
Eskridge has identified “lowering the stakes of politics” as the overriding 
end of judicial review within a pluralist democracy.44  A rights-as-
trumps frame makes hash of that goal, for it saps the losing side in  
constitutional disputes of the leverage to deliberate toward political con-
sensus.  The states not only urged a hands-off approach to partisan  
gerrymanders but also insisted that allowing the controlling political 
party to insulate itself from political competition is uniquely consistent 
with the judicial role.45 
It is in fact quite the opposite.  The best justification for judicial 
review in a pluralist democracy with a mature rights culture is that 
judges have the unique capacity to call partisans to the table, to enable 
them to see the dignity in each other’s commitments.  That trusty foot-
note in United States v. Carolene Products Co.,46 especially as Professor 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 41 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 42 Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-1161_mjn0.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S9PW-2CBE]. 
 43 See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018). 
 44 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy 
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1293–94 (2005). 
 45 See Brief for Appellants at 39–40, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161); Brief of Amici Curiae 
States of Michigan et al. in Support of Appellees at 3–8, Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018) 
(No. 17-333). 
 46 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
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John Hart Ely famously envisioned it, sought to reserve judicial review 
for instances in which the ordinary political process was unworthy of 
trust.47  If the measure of such a politics is a systematic disregard of the 
interests of, and a refusal to negotiate with, those not currently holding 
power, then courts today should be very busy indeed.48 
Rights are constantly at stake.  And while we take rights seriously 
enough, we do not do so reasonably enough.  Therein lies the path to 
rebuilding American politics, a feat that is, if I may, worthy of Hercules. 
II.  OUR ABSOLUTISM 
The first task is to spell out what “rights as trumps” means, connect 
this idea to categorical adjudication, and defend the claim that these 
labels fit U.S. constitutional jurisprudence.  Section A begins inductively 
by showing how the U.S. Supreme Court adjudicates a set of standard 
rights claims.  I use a series of cases to identify the core features of the 
categorical approach: analysis is weighted toward threshold interpretive 
questions rather than the application of law to fact, and so balancing is 
notionally understood as exceptional rather than inherent.  Section B 
describes the features and the global ascendancy of proportionality anal-
ysis, the leading competitor to the categorical approach.  Section C gen-
eralizes the conceptual differences between the two approaches, which 
may be stated in terms of at least four different frames: rules and stand-
ards; universalism and particularism; interpretation and empiricism; 
and legal authority and justification. 
A.  Taking Rights Reasonably 
In 2000, Stephen Harper, the future Canadian Prime Minister who 
was then president of a conservative lobbying group called the National 
Citizens Coalition, challenged Canada’s campaign finance laws.49  Un-
der section 350 of the Canada Elections Act,50 a third party could not 
spend more than $150,000 overall or more than $3000 in a given elec-
toral district in relation to a general election.51  Freedom of political 
expression is a fundamental freedom under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms,52 and so Harper claimed that section 350 and 
related provisions violated the Charter.53 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 47 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 75–77 (1980). 
 48 Cf. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (“[If] all laws representing essentially moral 
choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.”). 
 49 Harper v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.). 
 50 S.C. 2000, c 9 (Can.). 
 51 Id. § 350. 
 52 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 2(b), Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 53 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 50. 
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This claim would be perfectly intelligible under U.S. constitutional 
law.  It was the precise claim, differing only in the dollar amounts,  
that doomed the expenditure limits set forth in the Federal Election 
Campaign Act Amendments of 197454 in Buckley v. Valeo.55  A similar 
claim as applied to corporations and unions drawing on their general 
treasury funds doomed Title II of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act56 (BCRA) in Citizens United v. FEC.57 
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Act, but the outcome is 
less relevant for our purposes than the Court’s reasoning.  The majority 
held that the Act’s advertising restrictions infringed the right to political 
expression, and indeed the government conceded the point.58  But the 
Court found that the Act was nonetheless valid because it was “justified” 
under section 1 of the Charter,59 through which certain freedoms are 
guaranteed “subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”60 
The Canadian Supreme Court implements this constitutional com-
mand by asking a series of questions first memorialized in the Court’s 
decision in R. v. Oakes.61  The Court first discerns whether the law has 
in view a “pressing and substantial” purpose, typically a deferential in-
quiry, and one that was satisfied in Harper by the goals of “promot[ing] 
equality in political discourse,” “protect[ing] the integrity of the financ-
ing regime applicable to candidates and parties,” and “ensur[ing] that 
voters have confidence in the electoral process.”62  The Oakes test con-
tinues with an inquiry into means-end fit: Is the government’s action 
rationally related to that goal?63  In the case of section 350, the Court 
concluded that advertising-expense limits were rationally connected to 
the goal of preventing those with financial advantages from dominating 
the electoral discourse.64  The third step is to ask whether the act is 
necessary, in the sense of whether it minimally impairs the right.65  The 
majority held that section 350 satisfied this step because the restriction 
on third-party advertising was limited to a particular period before the 
election and to messages that were associated with a candidate or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 54 Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 55 424 U.S. 1, 6–7, 58 (1976) (per curiam). 
 56 Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in 36 U.S.C. § 510 (2012) and scattered 
sections of 52 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 2017)). 
 57 558 U.S. 310, 320–21, 365 (2010).  
 58 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 66. 
 59 Id. paras. 75, 121. 
 60 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.). 
 61 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 138–39 (Can.). 
 62 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. para. 92. 
 63 Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139. 
 64 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. paras. 104–09. 
 65 Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139. 
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party.66  A final step, sometimes called balancing in the strict sense, is 
to weigh the marginal impairment of the right against the marginal  
benefit to the government to ensure that there is no gross disproportion- 
ality.67  Here, the Court held that the value of electoral fairness and  
accessibility was sufficiently weighty to justify the impairment of third 
parties’ ability to influence the election through spending.68 
A comparison between Harper and its U.S. analogues in Buckley and 
Citizens United illustrates the difference between a categorical inquiry 
and proportionality analysis, of which the Oakes test is the canonical 
global exemplar.  First Amendment law in the United States rarely en-
tails deciding whether the government is going too far in infringing on 
what the Court concedes to be protected speech.  Analysis of the merits 
must await an answer to the antecedent question of what kind of speech 
restriction is at issue.  This inquiry is not qualitative, as in whether the 
speech being regulated is of relatively low or high value, but is rather 
categorical, and the categories are many.  Is the government discrimi-
nating on the basis of viewpoint;69 or content;70 or speaker’s identity;71 
or time, place, and manner?72  Is the government regulating expressive 
conduct?73  Commercial speech?74  Is the speech occurring in a tradi-
tional public forum?75  A limited public forum?76  A nonpublic forum?77  
Is the speaker the government?78  A government employee?79  If so, is 
the speech on a matter of public concern?80  Is it false?81  Is it obscene?82  
“Fighting words”?83  A “true threat”?84  Terrorism-related?85  The an-
swers to these questions motivate a responsive standard of review that 
calibrates how substantial or compelling the state interest must be and 
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 66 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. paras. 112–14. 
 67 Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 139–40. 
 68 Harper, [2004] 1 S.C.R. paras. 119–21. 
 69 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983). 
 70 See Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95–96 (1972). 
 71 See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 580 (2011). 
 72 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802–03 (1989). 
 73 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 74 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
 75 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). 
 76 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829–30 (1995). 
 77 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Adderley v. 
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 41 (1966). 
 78 See Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2245–46 (2015); 
Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 715 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 79 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573 (1968). 
 80 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146–47 (1983). 
 81 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 731–35 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the  
judgment). 
 82 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973). 
 83 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 84 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 85 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010). 
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how closely tailored to that interest the regulation must be to pass mus-
ter.  Implicitly, the Court understands that regulation of speech is nec-
essarily sensitive to context, but rather than assess the regulation in light 
of its context directly, it disciplines the inquiry by placing it into one of 
an ever-expanding set of boxes. 
The Buckley opinion was accordingly less about whether a $1000 
limit on individual campaign expenditures was a reasonable way of lev-
eling influence over the political process (a question the Court never 
entertained) than about whether such a limit was — in its essence — a 
restriction on either “symbolic speech” or the “time, place, and manner” 
of speech.86  Having decided that the limit fit neither box, the Court 
placed it into the box of a content restriction, which therefore required 
the strictest scrutiny.87  Once there, a good-government reform designed 
in response to the Watergate scandal88 found itself surrounded by laws 
of a very different character.  The Court compared the expenditure limit 
to laws requiring newspapers to give space to reply to critical editorial 
content89 or criminalizing the publication of election-day advocacy.90  
The Buckley Court took the cases invalidating such practices to stand 
for the proposition, apparently applicable in Buckley itself, that “no test 
of reasonableness can save [such] a state law from invalidation as a vi-
olation of the First Amendment.”91  It was not enough, it seems, simply 
to decide that those statutes were unreasonable. 
A quarter century after Buckley, in an effort to respond to perceived 
imbalances in political financing exacerbated by the decision’s cleaving 
of contribution limits from expenditure limits, Congress passed a law 
prohibiting corporations and unions from spending general treasury 
funds on independent advocacy in the run-up to a federal election.92  
Corporations and unions could still spend money on electioneering, but 
they had to do so through the artifice of a separate political action com-
mittee (PAC), or else more than two months before a general election or 
one month before a primary.93  
In 2007, an incorporated nonprofit called Citizens United wanted to 
advertise and make available through video-on-demand Hillary:  
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 86 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15–21 (1976) (per curiam). 
 87 See id. at 44–45. 
 88 See J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 
1003 (1976). 
 89 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50–51; see also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 
(1974). 
 90 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50–51; see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). 
 91 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added) (quoting Mills, 384 U.S. at 220). 
 92 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81, 91–92 
(2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (Supp. IV 2017)). 
 93 Id. § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 88–90 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 30104). 
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The Movie, a takedown of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, who was a can-
didate for the Democratic nomination for President.94  Writing for a 5–
4 majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that any speech restriction based 
on the speaker’s identity (here, its status as a corporation or union) re-
ceives the highest level of judicial scrutiny,95 a categorical determination 
that dramatically narrowed the justifications available to the govern-
ment.  The Court then efficiently dispensed with any suggestion that 
restricting corporate electioneering speech funded through general treas-
ury funds was narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in avoiding 
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, or in mitigating the fundrais-
ing and tax advantages conferred by use of the corporate form.96 
Citizens United presented the Court with an unusual number of 
grounds on which to avoid so blunt a holding.  As noted, the Act did 
not prohibit corporate speech but rather required that a small fraction 
of such speech be funded through a separate PAC.  In addition, the 
Court had previously limited the definition of corporate electioneering 
ads to those that are “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”97  From 
the outset, then, the field of regulation was far narrower than it might 
be for other instances of speaker-based restrictions; the prospect of this 
expenditure limit having a chilling effect on clearly protected speech was 
dim.98  Hillary: The Movie, a feature-length film, was obviously more 
than just an electioneering ad, and Citizens United was not a for-profit 
or shell corporation but rather an ideological organization funded  
primarily through individual contributions.99  It sought to release its 
film through video-on-demand, a customized service that — unlike tra-
ditional television advertising — does not risk overwhelming a captive 
audience with campaign propaganda.100 
Any of these points could have proven decisive to a Court that 
trained its analysis less on the threshold question of whether the legal 
regime triggered strict scrutiny and more on downstream questions of 
how burdensome that regime was in light of Citizens United’s particular 
situation.101  Instead, Justice Kennedy suggested, for example, that the 
government’s litigation position would support a ban on the printing of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010). 
 95 See id. at 340–41, 364–65. 
 96 Id. at 351–56, 360–61. 
 97 FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).  
 98 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 402, 415–19 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 99 See id. at 406–07. 
 100 Id. at 326 (majority opinion). 
 101 See id. at 404–05 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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books, a topic that dominated oral argument both times Citizens 
United — a case about neither books nor a ban — was argued.102 
It is tempting to attribute the differences between Harper and the 
U.S. cases to ideological diversity.  It is well documented that the United 
States is a global outlier in its courts’ zeal for freedom of speech.103  
Moreover, Citizens United was decided by a more conservative Court 
than the one that reached contrary earlier decisions in Austin v.  
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce104 and McConnell v. FEC.105  
Treating free speech as a trump might be the epiphenomenon rather 
than the primary one, which is more banal and outcome oriented. 
The U.S. approach to rights is eclectic, but it is nonetheless possible 
to generalize beyond Buckley and Citizens United.  Consider, briefly, 
five areas of doctrine that further show the problem: antidiscrimination 
law, social and economic rights, abortion, school integration, and the 
Second Amendment. 
1.  Antidiscrimination Law. — The Supreme Court maintains that 
both the Equal Protection Clause and the Free Exercise Clause require 
a finding that the defendant specifically intended to discriminate on the 
basis of a protected ground.106  The Court further maintains that its 
most rigorous, least deferential, most skeptical form of analysis is trig-
gered by any racial classification by the government, no matter the back-
ground history, minority status, or evident motivations of the groups or 
actors involved.107  In disparate impact cases across both race and reli-
gion, and in affirmative action cases as well, the Court has defended its 
formalistic approach explicitly on the ground that it could not otherwise 
modulate its jurisprudence.  That is, the Court has claimed that its ap-
proach was required because it could not otherwise adjudicate extreme 
but hypothetical cases that were not then before the Court. 
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 102 Transcript of Oral Argument passim (Sept. 9, 2009), Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-
205), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2008/08-205[Reargued]. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/T6TP-2PZG]; Transcript of Oral Argument passim (Mar. 24, 2009), Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_ 
transcripts/2008/08-205.pdf [https://perma.cc/CA6M-4CEF].  
 103 See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative 
Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 1523 (2003). 
 104 494 U.S. 652, 654–55 (1990) (upholding a state prohibition on spending corporate treasury 
funds on independent expenditures supporting or opposing candidates for state office). 
 105 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003) (upholding the majority of BCRA). 
 106 E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–33 (1993) 
(free exercise); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (same); Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 
U.S. 256, 271–72 (1979) (equal protection); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244–46 (1976) (same). 
 107 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215–18, 226–27 (1995). 
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Thus, in Washington v. Davis,108 in which the Court first declared 
that an equal protection violation required a claimant to show inten-
tional discrimination and not just disparate impact, Justice White wrote 
for the majority: 
  A rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless in-
valid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it benefits or burdens 
one race more than another would be far-reaching and would raise serious 
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, pub-
lic service, regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome 
to the poor and to the average black than to the more affluent white.109 
A decade later, the Court applied a similar principle again.  In 
McCleskey v. Kemp,110 it had to determine the constitutional relevance 
of statistics showing that black defendants with white victims were 
more likely to receive capital sentences than white defendants or de-
fendants whose victims were not white.111  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Powell registered his concern that an equality or Eighth Amendment 
claim of this sort, “taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious 
question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice sys-
tem.”112  “Thus,” the opinion continued, “if we accepted McCleskey’s 
claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing 
decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of 
penalty.”113  The assumption that such claims are — like claims of an 
indirectly discriminatory tax or welfare statute — judicially unmanage-
able reflects a predisposition against balancing and in favor of rights as 
trumps.114 
The Court has adopted the same posture in religious discrimination 
cases.  Employment Division v. Smith115 presented the Court with the 
question of whether members of an indigenous tribe for whom sacra-
mental peyote use held religious significance could be denied unemploy-
ment compensation after being fired for violating company drug  
policy.116  In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected the claim 
on the ground that a neutral and generally applicable law — here, the 
state’s criminal law outlawing peyote — does not violate the Free  
Exercise Clause just because it disproportionately burdens a religious 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 108 426 U.S. 229. 
 109 Id. at 248. 
 110 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
 111 Id. at 286–87. 
 112 Id. at 314–15. 
 113 Id. at 315. 
 114 See Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 
3172–79 (2015). 
 115 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 116 Id. at 874. 
  
2018] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 45 
practice in some of its applications.117  Justice Scalia assumed that con-
stitutional recognition of burdens of that sort would require a demand-
ing “compelling interest” test that would potentially require “religious 
exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”118  
Rather than needing to rule on claims for exemption from military ser-
vice and tax payments and manslaughter laws and compulsory vaccina-
tion and traffic laws and minimum wage laws and child neglect and 
animal cruelty laws and environmental protection and antidiscrimina-
tion laws — all of which Justice Scalia’s opinion carefully enumer-
ated — it is better, he said, that the Court cut off these claims at the 
root.119  It would otherwise be “courting anarchy.”120 
Equating disparate impact regimes with a lawless dystopia where all 
is permitted — dogs and cats living together and the like — ignores 
strategies of claim management that have proven resilient in the context 
of adjudication under numerous antidiscrimination statutes that 
broaden liability beyond the constitutional baseline.  Under the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991,121 a showing that an employment practice has a 
disparate impact on members of a protected class shifts the burden to 
the employer to show not a “compelling interest” but rather that the 
practice is job-related and consistent with business necessity.122  That 
standard codifies the case law as the Court had developed it prior to its 
outlying decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.123  What counts 
as disparate impact in the first place is not left to caprice but generally 
follows the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s 1978 rule of 
thumb: “A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less 
than four-fifths . . . of the rate for the group with the highest rate.”124  
Similarly directive but flexible doctrinal heuristics have developed 
under disparate impact statutes passed in the areas of voting rights and 
religious exercise.  The Voting Rights Act,125 as amended in 1982, does 
not subject claims of racial vote dilution to an intent requirement,126 but 
since 1986 the Court has combined a threshold analysis to identify the 
conditions under which racial vote dilution is theoretically possible with 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 117 Id. at 878–80, 882. 
 118 Id. at 888. 
 119 Id. at 888–89. 
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 121 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. 
Code). 
 122 Id. § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074 (amending § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by adding 
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 126 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (Supp. III 2016). 
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a totality of the circumstances test to find ultimate liability.127  And just 
as the “strict” scrutiny for disparate impact religious claims was rather 
famously muted and case specific prior to Smith,128 case law under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act129 (RFRA) has courted no anarchy 
to date.  To wit, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,130 several reli-
giously motivated employers sought exemptions from a Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) requirement, implementing the  
Affordable Care Act,131 that they provide their employees with health 
insurance plans that included birth control coverage.132  Justice  
Kennedy’s decisive concurring opinion refused to reduce the statute to 
any generalizable, rule-like accommodation requirement but instead 
noted that in the case itself, the government had simply not shown that 
it was unable to both meet the employer’s wishes and provide its em-
ployees with birth control coverage within HHS’s existing accommoda-
tion framework.133  The case was decided on its facts.134 
Categorical constitutional analysis also of course motivates the 
Court’s tiers-of-scrutiny framework, wherein the nature of the protected 
classification determines the Court’s standard of review.  Under the 
black letter rules, race gets strict scrutiny, gender intermediate scrutiny, 
and most other classifications rational basis review, under which any 
rational justification in support of a legitimate state objective suffices to 
withstand constitutional scrutiny, even if the justification is entirely  
hypothetical.135 
Matters are considerably more complicated, however, than this  
hornbook sketch allows.  Strict scrutiny in cases in which the state is 
reinforcing social hierarchy does not look quite like strict scrutiny in 
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 127 See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–44 (1986). 
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cases in which it seeks to combat that hierarchy.136  Some groups whose 
defining characteristics are said to trigger rational basis review — the 
children of undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, the disa-
bled — have at times seemed to benefit from more rigorous scrutiny of 
the government’s motives and methods.137  Departures from the frame-
work are invariably exposed in dissenting or concurring opinions, often 
with little or no rebuttal from the majority.138 
The Justices have not been forthcoming about their obvious inclina-
tions to moderate strict scrutiny in affirmative action cases or beef up 
rational basis review in other discrimination cases involving important 
social categories, but they have been forthright about their reasons for 
caution.  In his controlling opinion in Regents of the University of  
California v. Bakke,139 Justice Powell saw no “principled” basis on 
which to distinguish which minority groups should and should not re-
ceive the benefit of heightened scrutiny: “Not all of these groups can 
receive preferential treatment and corresponding judicial tolerance of 
distinctions drawn in terms of race and nationality,” he wrote, “for then 
the only ‘majority’ left would be a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon 
Protestants.”140  Likewise, in determining that rational basis review 
would continue to be the standard for claims of discrimination against 
the intellectually disabled, Justice White worried openly that if the 
Court applied a higher standard, it would face the difficult task of find-
ing “a principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have 
perhaps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, . . . [such 
as] the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm.”141  Notably, 
the Court went on to invalidate the zoning ordinance at issue in the case, 
signaling that rational basis review need not entail abdication of judicial 
review.142  In doing so, the Court undermined the legal clarity it had 
sought to preserve in declining to apply heightened scrutiny. 
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2.  Social and Economic Rights. — With limited exceptions,143 the 
Court has not allowed claims sounding in social and economic rights to 
get off the ground.  That reluctance follows directly from understanding 
rights as trumps.  Social and economic rights claims imply affirmative 
duties on the part of the government.  Such duties must always compete 
with other governmental imperatives and financial constraints, and so 
they cannot be absolute.  Thus, the International Covenant on  
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights144 obligates states to “take 
steps . . . to the maximum of [their] available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights” the covenant 
protects.145  “Progressive realization” has also been an influential and 
much-discussed remedial standard for social and economic rights pro-
tected under national constitutions.146 
The possibility that the positive obligations that paradigmatically at-
tach to social and economic rights might be both justiciable and suscep-
tible to moderating constructs such as progressive realization seems to 
have escaped the Court’s recognition.  All such rights claims receive 
minimum scrutiny, largely out of concern that the Court is incapable of 
making contextual judgments or engaging in balancing.  When, in  
Dandridge v. Williams,147 the Court denied that Maryland was consti-
tutionally obliged to calibrate welfare payments to family size, it refused 
to distinguish between cases involving “regulation of business or indus-
try” and those involving “the most basic economic needs of impover-
ished human beings.”148  The most deferential form of review was 
deemed appropriate in either kind of case, notwithstanding what the 
Court itself described as a “dramatically real factual difference” between 
the two cases.149 
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,150 in 
which the Court rejected the notion of a fundamental right to education, 
Justice Powell wondered how education could be “distinguished from 
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the significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shel-
ter,”151 which had already been held to be outside constitutional protec-
tion in cases such as Dandridge.  As with welfare rights, the Court’s 
argument was not grounded in the substantive value these rights might 
hold for the rights-bearer or for society.152  The problem, rather, was the 
perceived absence of any judicial capacity for translating obvious fac-
tual distinctions into a manageable adjudicative standard. 
In a related vein, the Court insists that, in the usual case, constitu-
tional rights apply only against state actors.153  The language of the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments supports that limitation,154 but the text 
would be little more than a pleading constraint were the Court to enter-
tain the notion that some rights require affirmative state action to be 
realized.  Claims against private actors could be reformulated as claims 
of the government’s duty to protect or to supervise.  In Deshaney v. 
Winnebago County Department of Social Services,155 Joshua 
DeShaney’s unsuccessful argument was, in substance, that he had a 
right not to be beaten senseless by his father, though it was styled as a 
duty on the part of state social workers to protect him.156  In Town of 
Castle Rock v. Gonzales,157 Jessica Gonzales would have had less need 
of a constitutional claim against her estranged husband for murdering 
their three children if she had won her substantive due process claim 
against the police for failure to enforce a restraining order against 
him.158  Notably, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
later found the United States liable for the state’s failure to protect the 
Gonzales children,159 relying on the European Court of Human Rights’s 
understanding of such a duty in progressive terms, as a question “of 
reasonable means, and not results.”160  Rigid application of the state 
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action doctrine is as much a matter of the categorical frame as it is a 
matter of any textual hook. 
3.  Abortion. — It is not difficult to describe abortion conflicts as 
implicating competing rights: that of the woman to autonomy over her 
body and that of the fetus to life.  Abortion rights further implicate the 
equality of women, whose lives are uniquely disrupted by the physical, 
social, and economic demands of motherhood.161  The reigning ap-
proach to disparate impact cases obscures the equality dimension of 
abortion rights,162 and the categorical frame impedes the Court from 
recognizing the state’s interest in fetal life as sounding in rights.  Justice 
Blackmun’s Roe v. Wade163 majority opinion said as much.  He wrote 
that a fetus is not a “person” within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that a contrary decision would mean that regulation 
of abortion was constitutionally required.164  For Justice Blackmun, the 
threshold question of fetal personhood acted as a constitutional on/off 
switch: if a fetus is a person, all abortion must be forbidden; if not, 
abortion on request must, to a point, be permitted.165 
The joint opinion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern  
Pennsylvania v. Casey166 is less categorical than Roe — famously so — 
and goes some way toward acknowledging, at least rhetorically, the rea-
sonable disagreement that sits at the heart of abortion politics.167  Still, 
Casey lacks the resources either to recognize the rights dimension of the 
state’s position or to more fully recognize the equality dimension of the 
woman’s.  One of Casey’s innovations was to permit the state to pursue 
an interest in the potential life of the fetus from the moment of concep-
tion and not just in the third trimester.168  In doing so, the joint opinion 
repudiated the Roe Court’s suggestion that first- and second-trimester 
abortion restrictions must be directed solely at the preservation of the 
woman’s health.169  At the same time, the Court shied away from itself 
treating fetal life as a matter of moral or constitutional significance.  For 
the Casey joint opinion, fetal life is simply an important and legitimate 
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interest the state might (or might not) pursue,170 no different analytically 
from its interest in, say, diverse broadcast television programming.171 
As much as the joint opinion fails to express the full weight of the 
state’s interest in fetal life, it fails also to express the full weight of the 
woman’s interest in equality.  Abortion restrictions of course affect men, 
but we can be confident that no state has ever required a man to bear 
or beget a child.  It cannot escape notice, moreover, that society places 
different demands of support and responsibility on mothers than on fa-
thers, a phenomenon supported by, but only marginally accounted for 
by, the physiology of pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation.172  Constitu-
tional equality law fails to recognize the additional burdens that abor-
tion restrictions place on women inasmuch as such burdens result not 
from a woman’s sex alone but from her status as a woman seeking an 
abortion.173  It is accordingly a “disparate impact” claim that, thanks to 
the categorical nature of such inquiries, receives rational basis review 
regardless of how burdensome it is. 
4.  School Integration. — The binary, categorical nature of the U.S. 
frame has been a subject of self-reflection in school integration cases.  
The Court’s remedial commitment in the wake of Brown v. Board of 
Education174 focused on school systems whose racial mixture had re-
sulted from de jure rather than simply de facto segregation.175  It re-
mains the case that systems whose segregated schools are notionally at-
tributable to the decisions of private individuals or institutions are of no 
constitutional moment; indeed, the Court’s decision in Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1176 suggested that 
the state is presumptively forbidden from taking race into account in 
order to remedy segregation of this sort.177  By stark contrast, it also 
remains the case that trial courts that find de jure racial segregation of 
public schools are empowered to put in place and enforce the most co-
ercive remedies known to constitutional law: busing of children across 
county lines and retaining jurisdiction over local educational decisions 
for decades. 
The distortion this binary has visited upon desegregation efforts was 
becoming increasingly clear into the 1970s.  In a case out of Charlotte-
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Mecklenburg County in North Carolina, the Court unanimously ap-
proved a district court–ordered busing plan, premised on a history of de 
jure segregation, between the mostly black areas of central Charlotte 
and the mostly white outlying suburbs.178  In distinction to other south-
ern jurisdictions that had been required to take affirmative steps to in-
tegrate their schools,179 Charlotte-Mecklenburg was a large urban 
county whose existing patterns of racial segregation were caused largely 
by nominally private housing decisions and government policies that  
did not relate specifically to public schools.180  Racial segregation in  
Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools resembled segregation in many northern 
jurisdictions that did not have state policies requiring or permitting seg-
regated schools.181  The de jure/de facto regime therefore mandated rad-
ically different treatment for jurisdictions that were, arguably, similar in 
relevant ways. 
Two years after the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, faced with a north-
ern school district in Denver,182 Justice Powell proposed to Justice  
Brennan a compromise, the essential terms of which are described in his 
concurring opinion: eliminate the de jure/de facto distinction and impose 
a nationwide standard that obligates public authorities not to bus stu-
dents to individual schools but rather to operate a “genuinely integrated 
school system.”183  Justice Brennan rejected Justice Powell’s overture.184  
Whatever we think of that move strategically or politically, it perpetu-
ated a system whereby courts are disempowered from addressing school 
segregation without making an antecedent and increasingly difficult fac-
tual finding of de jure segregation.  Those jurisdictions that have failed 
to achieve unitary status are selectively ostracized for decisions made by 
their predecessors even as their school systems are demographically sim-
ilar to others that escape public and judicial attention. 
5.  Second Amendment. — Even without its conspicuous reference 
to a “well regulated” militia,185 it would be obvious that the Second 
Amendment does not and cannot support an unqualified right of indi-
vidual Americans to keep and bear arms.  Restrictions on who may bear 
weapons, of what types, and where cannot, ipso facto, violate the con-
stitution of a functioning society.  Marrying that reality to the rights-as-
trumps frame has produced considerable confusion. 
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For decades, the constitutional common sense was that the Second 
Amendment did not protect individual gun rights but only the right of 
a state to keep an armed militia or, at best, the right of an individual to 
bear arms for the purpose of militia service.  As Justice McReynolds 
wrote in the 1939 case of United States v. Miller,186 the Amendment 
must be interpreted in view of its “obvious purpose to assure the contin-
uation and render possible the effectiveness” of the militia.187  In 1968, 
after the New Jersey Supreme Court relied upon the “collective right” 
view to uphold a state law imposing certain permitting, identification, 
and fitness requirements on gun purchasers,188 the U.S. Supreme Court 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal “for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion.”189  In 1980 the Court applied rational basis review to provisions 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968190 that for-
bade convicted felons from possessing firearms, reasoning that the Act 
did not “trench upon any constitutionally protected liberties.”191 
The upshot of the “collective rights” or “individual militia rights” 
view of the Second Amendment would be to make the right a nonstarter 
in the modern world, essentially inaccessible to present-day citizens.192  
Thus, the former Solicitor General and Harvard Law School Dean  
Erwin Griswold wrote in a 1990 op-ed titled “Phantom Second  
Amendment ‘Rights’” that the proposition that the Second Amendment 
poses “no barrier to strong gun laws is perhaps the most well-settled 
proposition in American constitutional law.”193  Former Chief Justice 
Burger later said the Amendment “doesn’t guarantee the right to have 
firearms at all”194 and called the argument “one of the greatest pieces of 
fraud, I repeat the word ‘fraud,’ on the American public by special in-
terest groups that I have ever seen.”195 
Whatever the pedigree of this view of the Second Amendment, its 
prominence has helped distort the debate over the Amendment’s reach.  
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Proponents of constitutional gun rights devoted tremendous energy to 
rebutting the collective rights position and relatively little energy to dis-
cussing standards of review or what regulations would or should survive 
scrutiny under the individual rights position.196  Many on both sides of 
the constitutional question have appeared to assume that the individual 
rights view would require strict scrutiny or some analogously exacting 
standard.197  Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. 
Heller198 opens with fifty pages excavating the “meaning” of the Second 
Amendment,199 followed by three paragraphs discussing potential ex-
ceptions to the individual right announced.200  The basis for those ex-
ceptions — laws restricting possession of firearms by convicted felons or 
the mentally ill, forbidding the bearing of arms “in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings,”201 and restrictions on gun 
sales202 — is left unexplained in the opinion.  The opinion treats the 
scope and substance of gun rights as an interpretive question to be de-
termined by legalistic sources such as original meaning and precedent,203 
not as an empirical question subject to qualitative analysis or a weighing 
of costs and benefits. 
That focus is even more explicit in the Heller majority’s brief discus-
sion of the D.C. handgun ban itself.  The Court rejected Justice Breyer’s 
suggestion, discussed below, that the right to bear arms might be subject 
to the state’s ordinary police powers: 
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection 
has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach.  The 
very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government — even 
the Third Branch of Government — the power to decide on a case-by-case 
basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.  A constitutional guar-
antee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitu-
tional guarantee at all. . . . We would not apply an “interest-balancing”  
approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie.  
The Second Amendment is no different.204 
This remarkable passage reveals an ideology of rights absolutism 
that this Part has argued is broadly shared at the Court.  It perpetuates 
the myth that interest balancing is never conducted, notwithstanding  
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its use, for example, in cases involving the Contracts Clause, the Due 
Process Clause, and the Takings Clause.205  Its suggestion that the enu-
meration of a right is inherently inconsistent with interest balancing or 
case-by-case adjudication could have been written by Dworkin himself, 
as Part III develops further.  Finally, the Court compared the Second 
Amendment to its next-door neighbor the First Amendment.  By seeking 
refuge in a category of rights the Court has already deemed sacred, the 
Heller opinion reinforces the view that sacredness is in the nature of 
rights themselves. 
Proportionality and balancing approaches to rights have long found 
favor with Justice Breyer.  Nearly two decades ago, concurring in Nixon 
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,206 he wrote that “where constitu-
tionally protected interests lie on both sides of the legal equation,” a 
balancing of interests rather than “a strong presumption against consti-
tutionality” is appropriate.207  In his recent book, The Court and the 
World, Justice Breyer describes the appeal of proportionality as lying in 
the transparency it brings to balancing, which is implicit within but dis-
claimed by proponents of the categorical approach.208 
It is not surprising, then, that Justice Breyer saw in Heller an oppor-
tunity to promote an alternative to the ideology of rights absolutism.  
Rather than linger on the threshold question of the “meaning” of the 
right the Second Amendment protects, as both the majority and Justice 
Stevens’s dissent did,209 he placed the weight of his analysis on what the 
government may do in virtue of the presence of an individual right to 
bear arms and in light of the state’s persistent and legitimate interest in 
public safety.210  In justifying that approach, Justice Breyer referred spe-
cifically to proportionality as desirable in a case in which “important 
interests lie on both sides of the constitutional equation.”211  In that con-
text, rights cannot coherently be deemed even presumptively absolute.  
The Court’s role is not to assess their application in the abstract but 
rather to assess, at a remove, “whether the statute burdens a protected 
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s 
salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”212  This 
assessment is largely empirical in nature, and one in which the legisla-
ture’s factfinding expertise is owed a degree of deference.213 
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* * * 
The examples sketched above show the vitality of the categorical 
frame within American constitutional law.  At least four generalizable 
elements are apparent.  First, the Court resorts casually to slippery slope, 
hypothetical arguments to silence claims made in the here and now, as 
in disparate impact and positive rights cases.  Second, the Court  
struggles to reconcile potential rights conflicts with existing doctrinal 
architecture, as in the abortion area.  Third, the Court maintains thin 
heuristics to temper its entry into complex social problems, as in the 
school integration context.  Finally, the Court adopts a romantic vision 
of doctrinal simplicity and coherence, as in Heller. 
A rights-as-trumps ideology does not cause these features of U.S. 
constitutional law, at least not uniquely.  They are overdetermined 
within the cases discussed, all of which implicate rich and unruly social 
conflicts that constitutional law could not fully discipline even if we 
wanted it to.  The point, though, is that a rights-as-trumps ideology 
makes these doctrinal moves necessary.  To the degree these features of 
U.S. constitutional law are a problem, which Part III addresses directly, 
the U.S. approach denies courts the resources to be part of the solution.  
The following section fleshes out what an alternative vision of rights 
looks like outside our borders, where it has become dominant. 
B.  Proportionality 
In the city of Mönchengladbach in the West German State of North 
Rhine-Westphalia, a woman wanted to feed pigeons in a public 
square.214  A local ordinance forbade her from doing so, and so  
she raised a constitutional challenge.215  Specifically, she argued that 
denying her the right to feed pigeons implicated her right to “free devel-
opment of [her] personality,” which the German Basic Law protects.216  
Like substantive due process in the United States, the right to personal-
ity provides some residual protection for liberty interests that implicate 
human dignity but that other provisions of the Basic Law do not specif-
ically cover, including freedom of action in recreational and economic 
spheres.217 
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Faced with this claim, the Federal Constitutional Court conceded, 
without analysis, that the right to free development of one’s personality 
“includes the feeding of pigeons on streets and in public places as an 
expression of love of animals.”218  The fact that the applicant had a right 
to feed pigeons did not, however, require the government to articulate a 
“compelling interest” or a “narrowly tailored” policy in support of limit-
ing that right.  For the German court, the right to feed pigeons does not 
implicate the “sacrosanct” (unantastbare) area of private life; as such, 
“everyone as a citizen who relates and is bound to a community must 
accept government measures executed in the prevailing interest of the 
community as a whole while strictly complying with the principle of 
proportionality.”219  Accordingly, it was sufficient for the court to note 
that feral pigeons gathered in flocks can cause significant property dam-
age and that banning their feeding on public streets or in public facilities 
was a “very limited interference with the freedom to exercise the love of 
animals.”220  The court added that this measure was the mildest way to 
achieve the desired public benefit and suggested that the ban may have 
already led to a migration of pigeons to other areas.221 
The Pigeon-Feeding Case has come in for serious criticism, even rid-
icule.222  I do not use it as an advertisement for proportionality, which 
is far from perfect.223  The case is useful, rather, as a contrast dye that 
helps to illuminate the significant framing difference between this style 
of analysis and what Americans are familiar with.  A U.S. court would 
likely place the weight of its analysis on a question that gave the German 
Constitutional Court no pause: whether the Constitution protects even 
a prima facie right to feed pigeons.  A claim of this sort would likely be 
pleaded under the rubric of substantive due process, which would re-
quire a showing that the feeding of pigeons implicated a “fundamental” 
right, one involving “personal choices central to individual dignity and 
autonomy”224 or “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty”225 or 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”226  A court un-
willing to place the right to education within this august category is most 
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unlikely to be in the bag for pigeon feeders.227  Without a right to cling 
to, the claimant could win only if there was no conceivable rational basis 
for the pigeon-feeding law,228 a standard that is at least notionally quite 
distant from “strictly complying with the principle of proportionality,” 
which the German court said was required.229  
The Pigeon-Feeding Case thus models a contrasting vision that 
places the weight of analysis and attendant scrutiny on the nature of the 
government’s interest in and justification for limiting the right rather 
than on the essence, provenance, and scope of the right at stake.  As 
Professor Kai Möller observes, many proportionality regimes feature 
what has been called “rights inflation,” or “the increasing protection of 
relatively trivial interests as (prima facie) rights.”230  A certain promis-
cuity in declaring rights to exist is accompanied by a certain austerity in 
elevating interference with rights into violations of them.231 
Proportionality seeks to achieve this calibration through a structured 
approach to limitations on rights,232 in the style of the Canadian  
Supreme Court’s opinion in Oakes.  It is not just another word for “bal-
ancing,” and indeed there are proponents of proportionality who believe 
balancing as such should play at most a limited role.233  Proportionality 
is better understood as a transsubstantive analytic frame, a kind of in-
termediate scrutiny for all,234 that is designed to discipline the process 
of rights adjudication on the assumption that rights are both important 
and, in a democratic society, limitable. 
Some form of proportionality is practiced in courts throughout the 
world, such that even some of its critics have called it “the jus cogens of 
human rights law.”235  It is ubiquitous within the domestic constitutional 
courts of Europe, the European Court of Human Rights, and the  
European Court of Justice.236  It is, as noted, the Canadian Supreme 
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Court’s default mode of analysis under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.237  The last decade has seen a convergence on the use of 
proportionality in Latin American courts, including especially in the in-
fluential jurisdictions of Colombia, Brazil, and Mexico.238  It is the basic 
approach in the courts of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and  
Malaysia.239  It is a standard tool of adjudication in South Africa and in 
Israel.240  Even in Australia, whose constitution has no bill of rights and 
which has a long history of interpretive “legalism,”241 the high court has 
applied proportionality analysis in limiting the implied right to freedom 
of political communication.242 
Typical proportionality formulations comprise either three or four 
ordered steps in the analysis: (1) some discernment of the nature of the 
claimed right; (2) an assessment of the means-ends fit between the law 
or act and some legitimate governmental objective; (3) a “least- 
restrictive means” or “minimal impairment” test that asks whether the 
government has less rights-impairing alternatives it could have pursued; 
and (4) balancing in the strict sense, which requires the adjudicator to 
assess whether there is significant disproportionality between the mar-
ginal benefit to the government and the marginal cost to the rights-
bearer.243  Different jurisdictions place different weights on the various 
steps in the analysis,244 and, in the nature of things, proportionality anal-
ysis, while notionally transsubstantive, can take different shape for dif-
ferent kinds of rights.245 
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C.  A Broader View 
A commitment to proportionality does not suppose a commitment to 
any particular model or formulation, such as Canada’s Oakes test.246  
For the purposes of this Foreword, it is useful simply to identify the 
relative positions of the categorical approach and proportionality within 
some of the conceptual frames that have been applied to the structure 
of legal norms.  This section identifies four such frames: rules and stand-
ards; universalism and particularism; interpretation and empiricism; 
and authority and justification.  Each frame can accommodate a spec-
trum of approaches, some of which may combine elements of propor-
tionality and categorical adjudication.  The plea of this Foreword will 
be to move U.S. constitutional adjudication closer than it is now to the 
proportionality end of those frames. 
1.  Rules and Standards. — The distinction between rules and stand-
ards or, alternatively, rules and principles, is familiar in the law, and is 
the dichotomy to which the categorical/proportionality binary most ob-
viously corresponds.247  Legal norms formulated as rules identify legally 
relevant facts ex ante and direct responsive legal conclusions.248   
Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks describe a “rule” as “a legal 
direction which requires for its application nothing more than the deter-
mination of the happening or non-happening of physical or mental 
events — that is, determinations of fact.”249  The categorical approach 
is rule-like insofar as it identifies the facts relevant to placing a rights 
dispute into a particular category (the various tiers of scrutiny, paradig-
matically), and the result largely follows from that initial identification. 
Legal norms formulated as standards (or principles) identify a set of 
purposes or values and rely on downstream decisionmakers to conform 
the law to those purposes or values.  Hart and Sacks write that a stand-
ard is “a legal direction which can be applied only by making, in addi-
tion to a finding of what happened or is happening in the particular 
situation, a qualitative appraisal of those happenings in terms of their 
probable consequences, moral justification, or other aspect of general 
human experience.”250  Proportionality retains some rule-like elements, 
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but its affinity to standards results from its essential injunction that ad-
judicators make qualitative judgments about the law’s requirements in 
light of competing values and social facts.251 
The German political theorist Robert Alexy has been influential in 
suggesting that proportionality is necessary to adjudication of legal 
norms that take the form of principles.  He is most focused on the rights 
to liberty, equality, and dignity protected by the German Basic Law,252 
but his work has been influential outside Germany both because of its 
cogency and because many constitutional systems, including the U.S. 
system, protect rights that appear to share this structure.  Alexy’s core 
insight is that while rules are norms that must either be fulfilled or not 
fulfilled, principles are best understood as “optimization requirements,” 
that is, “norms which require that something be realized to the greatest 
extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities.”253  Those pos-
sibilities are determined both by empirical reality and by other rules and 
principles that mutually constitute the legal system.  Because principles 
“lack the resources to determine their own extent in light of competing 
principles and what is factually possible,”254 principles must, inherently, 
be subject to weighing.  It is possible to optimize a principle even with-
out vindicating it in a particular case, so long as the policy embraced by 
the competing principle is suitable, necessary (as in not gratuitously bur-
densome), and pursued proportionately.255 
On this view, understanding rights purely as rules would sever their 
link to proportionality, and so Alexy’s intervention requires a premise 
that some will contest.  I am sympathetic to Alexy’s framework and to 
its application to the U.S. Constitution: most of the rights Americans 
care about are grounded in norms best described as standards or prin-
ciples.  Still, as Part III explores more fully, this Foreword’s call for 
proportionality in the United States does not depend on ascribing a par-
ticular ontology to the Constitution’s rights provisions. 
2.  Universalism and Particularism. — Academics tend to be espe-
cially prone to distinguishing “splitters” from “lumpers.”  Splitters, the 
historian Jack Hexter observes, “like to point out divergences, to per-
ceive differences, to draw distinctions.”256  By contrast, “[i]nstead of  
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noting differences, lumpers note likenesses; instead of separateness, con-
nection.”257  Lumpers are universalists.  They search for systems that 
can be constructed out of the mess of observable norms.  Splitters are 
particularists.  More comfortable with a multiplicity of systems, or with 
a highly variegated single system, they are apt to draw distinctions and 
emphasize difference. 
Universalism is often associated with the rule of law,258 which re-
quires the law to be general, transparent, and free from exceptions, the 
same qualities that characterize rule-based decisionmaking.259  The cat-
egorical approach to adjudication seeks to homogenize the law in just 
this way and thereby both to streamline and to regularize the admin-
istration of justice.  Universalism in constitutional adjudication tends to 
emphasize the law’s major premises260: restrictions on speech are dan-
gerous; racial discrimination is wrong; the state may (or, depending on 
one’s view, may not) enact morals legislation.  It tends to overlook po-
tential variation within the law’s minor premises: not all speech is 
equally valuable; not all racial discrimination is morally equivalent; not 
all morals legislation is equally burdensome or justifiable.  Conflicts of 
rights present special problems for universalists because the major and 
minor premises are indistinguishable a priori.261 
Particularism places great weight on whether the law’s minor prem-
ises can complete the syllogism.  The danger, of course, is that too much 
contextualism can undermine the major premise, and adjudicators and 
legislators might not know enough to draw the necessary distinctions.  
Universalists prefer heuristics that reduce the error costs involved in 
permitting adjudicators to assess directly the fit between the law’s over-
arching values and particular conflicts.  Particularists are more confi-
dent in the adjudicator’s ability to perform that assessment than they 
are in the law’s ability to develop a reliable heuristic.  For the particu-
larist, the Constitution’s substantive norms cannot be realized without 
significant specificity in their application.  Slippery slopes are standard 
rhetorical tropes for universalists.  For the particularist, the slippery 
slope is not a problem “while this Court sits.”262 
3.  Interpretation and Empiricism. — The rights-as-trumps position 
frames rights adjudication as predominantly an interpretive exercise.  
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The Constitution contains rights, and the question for the Court is what 
those rights mean, both at their core and at their margins.  Courts may 
excavate that meaning using the traditional tools of constitutional anal-
ysis: text, history, structure, precedent, and prudential considerations.263  
Those tools are used to mine the historical and precedential markers — 
determined in advance of the particular controversy — that will instruct 
the adjudicator as to the correct outcome.  In light of this frame, it is 
not surprising that debates over the right way to conduct constitutional 
analysis in these terms have dominated U.S. constitutional discourse for 
several decades, and without interruption since the rights explosion that 
began under the Warren Court.264 
Proportionality frames rights adjudication as predominantly an em-
pirical exercise.  The question for the adjudicator is not primarily what 
the rights in the Constitution “mean.”  Rather, in light of rights inflation, 
the question is whether the facts of the particular dispute form a suffi-
cient basis for the government to have acted as it did.  Is it responding 
to a genuine and cognizable problem?  Is it doing so through genuinely 
responsive instruments?  Are there other instruments available that 
would be less burdensome to rights-holders?  Is the benefit to be gained 
out of proportion to the harm inflicted?  Answering these questions does 
not require extensive analysis of constitutional text, history, or prece-
dent.  Rather, it requires reliable access to social facts.265 
None of the above is to suggest that proportionality is purely tech-
nocratic or does not require value judgments.266  It is rather that pro-
portionality rejects the assumption that submitting policy judgments to 
judicial review requires that they be submitted to distinctively juridical 
technologies of dispute resolution — textual, historical, and case anal- 
ysis, for example.  Proponents of proportionality are relatively comfort-
able with transparent judicial second-guessing of policy judgments on 
the ground that those judgments were qualitatively inadequate in light 
of facts about the world. 
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4.  Authority and Justification. — The previous discussion gestures 
at a defense of rights as trumps rooted in separation of powers.  Judges 
have a distinct role morality and institutional competence that orient 
them toward tasks suited to private law dispute resolution and criminal 
adjudication: textual exegesis in applying a statute; divining the will of 
the parties, for example, to a will or contract;267 judging an actor’s intent 
in order to determine his or her legal culpability.  Rebalancing the gov-
ernment’s reasons for passing a law seems to exercise legislative power, 
especially in the absence of a clearly delineated right. 
Migrating judicial review from private to public law puts some pres-
sure on this model.  In a public law dispute, engaging in textual exegesis 
or divining the intentions of the parties often entails direct confrontation 
with the contrary political and even constitutional judgments of public 
authorities.  A legal culture committed to the justiciability of public law 
disputes can respond to the problem of overlapping jurisdiction either 
by seeking to draw clear lines of authority or by subjecting the actions 
of the political branches to substantive demands for rationality.  And so 
Cohen-Eliya and Porat, borrowing loosely from the South African 
scholar Etienne Mureinik,268 contrast what they describe as the  
American legal tradition’s “culture of authority” with what they call an 
emerging global legal “culture of justification.”269  Within a culture of 
authority, public law “focuses on delimiting the borders of public action 
and on ensuring that decisions are made only by those authorized to 
make them.”270  Within a culture of justification, on the other hand, the 
legitimacy of governmental action “is justified in terms of its cogency 
and persuasiveness, that is, its rationality and reasonableness.”271 
On Cohen-Eliya and Porat’s view, the U.S. political question doc-
trine and high barriers to standing are symptomatic of the U.S. legal 
culture’s continued policing of lines of institutional political authority.272  
Proportionality jurisdictions tend to have muted or nonexistent political 
question doctrines and often have much lower standing requirements 
than would be conceivable in U.S. federal courts.273  Many such juris-
dictions permit review by governmental bodies, or subsets thereof, and 
permit preenforcement (or even preenactment) challenges to legisla-
tion.274  These jurisdictions are less concerned with separation of powers 
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in the style envisioned by Montesquieu and more concerned with  
reason-giving as the ultimate source of governmental power.275 
III.  CONSEQUENCES 
There is no perfect technology of judicial review.  Public law disputes 
require judges with relatively little accountability to evaluate political 
judgments premised on competing and often reasonable assessments of 
constitutionality made by government officials.  The core claim of this 
Foreword is that a proportionality-like approach is better suited to ad-
judication of rights disputes within a rights-respecting democracy.  This 
Part substantiates that claim by highlighting the costs of rights as 
trumps. 
Section A engages with Dworkin’s well-known critique of balancing 
and shows how his approach can emasculate rights as much as it can 
protect them.  Dworkin believed rights should be free of infringement 
except in the face of contrary rights or genuine emergency.  Proportion-
ality does not concede that lack of meaningful review is the only alter-
native to rights as trumps or that other kinds of personal interests that 
are not “rights” are left to legislative prerogative.  In a complex society, 
Dworkin’s binary view of rights puts too much pressure on the threshold 
interpretive question of whether a right is at issue. 
Section B discusses two broad ways in which rights as trumps dis-
torts constitutional law.  First, the frame frustrates the law’s ability to 
align rights recognition with our collective sense of justice.  Second, the 
rights-as-trumps view encourages judges either to stretch doctrinal 
frameworks that do not fit or to ignore such frameworks whenever they 
feel inconvenient. 
Section C argues that rights as trumps dulls the constitutional con-
science of political actors by refusing to account for the constitutional 
right of the community to embody its political vision in the law. 
Section D then turns to a different and under-explored kind of cost.  
Rights as trumps does not just coarsen our constitutional claims; it 
coarsens us as citizens.  A world in which a litigant is either a rights-
bearer whose situation trumps contrary government action, or is not a 
rights-bearer and is therefore at the mercy of the state, is a world of 
enemies.  In such a world, submitting a dispute to constitutional adju-
dication is a declaration that there is no space for negotiation between 
the competing positions.  The government’s claim is necessarily that the 
rights-bearer is wholly beneath constitutional concern, and the rights-
bearer’s claim is that the government is a bad actor and not just a 
clumsy one.  In a rapidly polarizing world, the judicial department must 
do better than this. 
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Section E discusses some of proportionality’s own problems and of-
fers some responses.  The section highlights four in particular.  First, 
proportionality might ignore positive constitutional law, which might 
not countenance rights inflation and which might condemn the rights 
deflation implicit in proportionality.  Second, proportionality does not 
adequately distinguish between rights and interests.  Third, proportion-
ality makes judicial activism more transparent, which has both costs 
and benefits.  Finally, apex courts in systems in which constitutional 
jurisdiction is decentralized have some duty to articulate legal rules in 
order to promote coherence and uniformity. 
A.  Dworkin’s Critique 
This Foreword’s title is a phrase and a concept commonly linked to 
the legal philosophy of Ronald Dworkin.  This section identifies the 
points of departure from Dworkin’s ideas.  At bottom, the critical point 
of departure is that the claim this Foreword advances is not, as 
Dworkin’s was, a deontological one about the nature of rights and the 
moral duties the state owes to rights-bearers.  It is, rather, a consequen-
tialist argument that rests on a set of empirical assumptions about how 
judicial review is practiced in U.S. courts.  Varying those assumptions 
varies the argument.  Volumes have been written on Dworkin’s thought, 
including his thinking about rights in particular.276  The inductive 
method introduced above shows that this Foreword’s argument means 
to be less a criticism of Dworkin than of the Court.277 
Still, given that Dworkin’s defense of rights as trumps remains ca-
nonical, it is worth articulating why it does not meet, much less defeat, 
the argument made here.  Dworkin’s basic argument is that holding a 
right limits the reasons that may be advanced for the government to 
deprive the rights-bearer of whatever it is that the right protects.278  
Those reasons may be grounded in the need to protect conflicting rights, 
to prevent catastrophe, or perhaps to secure some other unusually sig-
nificant public benefit, but they may not be grounded in a utilitarian 
argument that the public is better off if the right is violated than if it is 
honored.279  To hold a right that can be balanced away against the pub-
lic good is not to hold one at all; it is, rather, to be at the majority’s 
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mercy notwithstanding good reasons to suppose the majority has denied 
the putative rights-holder equal concern and respect.280 
Dworkin’s use of the term “right” is a specific one, as it must be for 
him to endorse the dramatic consequences of identifying an abridgment.  
Dworkin’s concern is neither with mere interests nor even with legally 
or constitutionally protected entitlements, even those subjectively expe-
rienced as intense.281  Dworkin’s interest is in those rights “necessary to 
protect [a person’s] dignity, or his standing as equally entitled to concern 
and respect, or some other personal value of like consequence.”282  More-
over, the right to be governed by laws enacted by democratically chosen 
representatives — which is to say, the right of a citizen to the fruits of 
participation in self-governance — cannot count as a right in Dworkin’s 
sense.283  Sustaining an individual right has the inevitable consequence 
of infringing upon a “right” of a people to self-governance, at least in a 
narrow sense.  As Dworkin writes, “[a] right against the Government 
must be a right to do something even when the majority thinks it would 
be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for 
having it done.”284 
Because Dworkin is focused on rights that by his definition are of 
fundamental importance, he is eager to say that abridging them on util-
itarian grounds works an intense and certain dignitary harm.  He is less 
focused on the serious consequences of declaring that every other inter-
est is not a right.285  To understand the consequences of treating people 
in this way, consider the case of affirmative action, which Dworkin ad-
dresses in Taking Rights Seriously.286  The book was first published 
three years after the Court decided DeFunis v. Odegaard,287 its first 
foray into what was then commonly referred to as “reverse discrimina-
tion.”  Marco DeFunis sued various public officials, alleging racial dis-
crimination, after he was denied admission to the University of  
Washington Law School.288  The case made its way to the Supreme 
Court, which held that DeFunis’s suit, which sought injunctive relief, 
was moot in light of the fact that, having won at various stages below, 
he was already approaching graduation.289 
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Addressing the merits, Dworkin argued that DeFunis had no consti-
tutional right to race-neutral admission to a public law school.290  Be-
cause law schools discriminate in admissions as a matter of course, dis-
criminating on the basis of race did not, without more, deprive DeFunis 
of equal concern or respect.291  Of course, a black applicant denied ad-
mission to a public law school on the basis of racial animus does have a 
constitutional claim,292 and so some theory is needed to explain why 
accepting that claim but not DeFunis’s treats him as an equal.  Dworkin 
answers this concern with an elaborate argument: In the United States, 
discrimination against blacks relies on “external” preferences (prefer-
ences regarding others rather than regarding ourselves) about human 
virtue, whereas discrimination against whites in the form of affirmative 
action relies mainly on ideal arguments about justice.293  Counting ex-
ternal preferences in a utilitarian calculus stacks the deck against the 
targets of prejudice.294 
Dworkin’s argument functions reasonably well as a cause for skep-
ticism about utilitarian justifications for discrimination against racial 
minorities.  It does little to justify treating racial discrimination against 
DeFunis as of no constitutional moment.  If DeFunis has no rights, then 
the school’s basis for discriminating against him need satisfy no more 
than minimal rationality.  The University of Washington had rejected 
him through a two-track admissions program that subjected white stu-
dents to a different and independent process from the one used for mi-
nority students.295  Under rational basis review, whether the university’s 
racially selective policy was created with meticulous care or with nearly 
maximal clumsiness should be irrelevant to a reviewing court.  Whether 
the policy classified applicants on the basis of test scores or geography 
or race — if (and only if?) whites were disadvantaged — it would re-
ceive no meaningful constitutional scrutiny. 
Whatever the ultimate result, that analysis would be blind to at least 
two different (and related) social facts, both of which should matter to 
constitutional adjudication.  First, an analysis that treats some racial 
classifications as beneath constitutional concern would not resonate 
with Americans’ social experience of racial classification.  The history 
and continuing salience of race in the United States ensure that  
governmental racial classification is a sensitive practice, one that feels 
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different to its objects than, say, classification by census tract, and one 
that citizens have good reason to scrutinize. 
Second, race is different as a matter of positive constitutional law.  
The Constitution singles out race as an invidious ground for discrimi-
nation, explicitly in the Fifteenth Amendment and implicitly through 
the text and history of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.296  
For Dworkin, that observation begs the question.  The Constitution’s 
ban on discrimination implements an abstract principle,297 and Dworkin 
is telling us, normatively, how to translate that principle into a rule of 
decision in the specific instance of race-based affirmative action.  Again, 
Dworkin’s interest is in why invidious discrimination against blacks is 
different from — and qualitatively worse than — race-based affirmative 
action.  One can reach the same conclusion and nonetheless believe that 
a race-based affirmative action program requires greater justification 
and must be implemented with greater care than a government program 
that classifies individuals on other grounds.  The Constitution compels 
the latter view, and no Justice has ever contested it.298  Dworkin does 
not provide us with the resources to know what to make of such a claim. 
Nothing in the theory of rights as trumps obligates courts to treat all 
mere interests in the same way.  A constitutional law that treats rights 
as trumps and subjects other governmental infringements on liberty to 
a balancing test is intelligible, even if it does not describe the American 
case.  But once it is conceded that searching judicial review is sometimes 
appropriate for mere interests, then Dworkin’s point of departure from 
proportionality becomes a semantic one.  It is consistent with propor-
tionality to assume that certain rights infringements require an unusual 
degree of justification above and beyond what might be required for 
others.299  Whether all rights retain the name or whether some are rele-
gated to “interests” or “values” or “bananas” is rhetorical. 
Thus, Dworkin’s second conceptual point, that rights that are not 
trumps are not rights at all, must be reevaluated.  Majoritarianism en-
tails that those policies that, on balance, improve the general welfare 
more than they infringe on individual interests prevail.  To call some-
thing a right, on Dworkin’s view, is to remove it from this stoic calculus.  
It is simply wrong, though, to suggest that there is no analytic space 
between rights as trumps and utilitarian balancing.  Proportionality is a 
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technology of justice that speaks precisely to Dworkin’s concern that the 
“right” of a majority to see its policies enacted into law not be conflated 
with the rights of individuals.  For just as an individual may have mere 
interests that do not implicate equal concern in the way that rights do, 
so too do groups of citizens have rights to self-governance that may be 
distinguished from mere interests in seeing to it that certain policies are 
enacted.300 
Proportionality analysis is an ordeal that requires the government to 
justify its actions with evidence or good faith assumptions and to act 
with restraint.  In putting the government through its paces, proportion-
ality sharpens the government’s ends and means to those that are  
necessary to vindicate its interests and are respectful of the impact on 
individuals.  Proportionality does not treat rights as trumps, but neither 
does it simply subject them to utilitarian balancing.  Its aim is to take 
individual rights, the government’s reasons, and the government’s 
methods for no more and no less than they are worth. 
B.  Trumps as Distortions 
Rights as trumps disfigures constitutional law.  Section III.B.1 argues 
that it dissociates rights from notions of substantive justice.  Section 
III.B.2 argues that it encourages judges to blur the edges of the catego-
ries they construct. 
1.  Too Little Justice. — Federal courts are not staffed by revolution-
aries, philosophers, or divine heroes.  Both as a matter of their temper-
ament and the appointment strategy of those who appoint them, judges 
are typically mainstream lawyers well attuned to the selfsame role mo-
rality that sustains the rights-as-trumps ideology.  If the implication of 
declaring an interest to be a right is that the right is immune from vir-
tually any legislative or executive interference, judges socialized in this 
way will be cautious in issuing such declarations, and appropriately  
so.  Dworkin himself performs that caution in reaching the improbable 
conclusion that white applicants denied admission to a public university 
in part on the basis of race have no constitutional claim at all. 
Without more, rights as trumps disturbs the relationship between 
constitutional law and justice.301  Thus, while substantive due process 
empowers the Fourteenth Amendment to recognize fundamental rights 
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notwithstanding the lack of textual specification, there is no constitu-
tional right to education, to food, to shelter, or to health care.302  But 
drug companies have a right to receive pharmacy records so as to mar-
ket pharmaceuticals to doctors with greater precision.303  Private indi-
viduals have the right to keep loaded handguns within blocks of the 
White House and the Capitol,304 in one of the most violent cities in 
America.305  One need not dispute the justice of these rights to believe 
that they are not more fundamental or vital to human flourishing than 
many other rights not recognized by the Court. 
The difference between these rights and the many social and eco-
nomic rights the Court has refused to entertain is not that they are nec-
essarily better specified within the Constitution.  It is rather that the 
Court satisfied itself that it was able to articulate their limits.  Dissenting 
in McCleskey v. Kemp, the death penalty disparate impact case discussed 
in Part II,306 Justice Brennan called the concern over the generativity of 
rights a “fear of too much justice.”307  In the absence of a technology for 
managing this fear, judges will act upon it.  Proportionality is such a 
technology. 
One special application of this problem is conflicts of rights.   
American courts rarely identify such conflicts even when their existence 
is patent.308  Abortion presents no conflict because fetuses are not per-
sons.309  Victims of hate speech or women objecting to pornography are 
seeking to curtail speech, not seeking to vindicate their rights or the 
rights of others.310  Victims of affirmative action claim rights against 
racial discrimination, but beneficiaries are not viewed as claiming rights 
to equal opportunity in elite education or government contracting.  
Lochner v. New York311 is criticized for elevating the right to contract 
rather than for failing to see embodied within the Bakeshop Act the 
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right to adequate working conditions.  The couple in Masterpiece 
Cakeshop present to the Court not as rights-bearers but merely as the 
beneficiaries of a state “interest” in nondiscrimination against gay  
people. 
This lack of recognition reflects, in part, a reluctance to understand 
legislation or other state action as furthering rather than sitting in op-
position to constitutional rights.312  The problem is conceptual and not 
just semantic.  Adjudicating rights conflicts requires a balancing of 
rights.  The U.S. tiers-of-scrutiny framework is sometimes described as 
a balancing test,313 but that description is accurate only in an attenuated 
sense.  Strict and intermediate scrutiny require a decisionmaker to assess 
the motivations and internal logic of the government’s actions, but that 
inquiry is sequestered from any assessment of the nature of the burden 
imposed on the litigant.  The U.S. framework tests the adequacy sim-
pliciter of the government’s action, not its adequacy in light of the right 
at stake.  It is a stepwise approach that leaves no room for the relative 
quality or value of the rights at stake to inform the ultimate issue.  The 
best a court can do within this framework is to declare that the govern-
ment has a compelling or important interest in protecting a competing 
right; it cannot assess the relative weights of the competitors.314 
It must be acknowledged that using the presence of potential rights 
conflicts to shorten the reach of rights has a dispiriting history in  
American constitutional law.  The best known academic response to 
Brown v. Board of Education appeared in Professor Herbert Wechsler’s 
1959 Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School, which later became the 
article Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.315  Wechsler 
called for judges to issue “genuinely principled” judgments,316 by which 
he meant those “that rest[] on reasons with respect to all the issues in 
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend 
any immediate result that is involved.”317 
So stated, Wechsler’s admonition seems unremarkable, almost an ax-
iomatic restatement of the rule of law.  Where he ran into trouble was 
in his specific application of this universalist creed to Brown.  For 
Wechsler, the notion that state-enforced racial segregation, race-neutral 
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on its face, worked a special kind of injury on blacks was not sustainable 
as a ground for judicial decision.318  Instead, the real issue was that it 
infringed on the freedom of association, but so too did its remedy: “[I]f 
the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces 
an association upon those for whom it is unpleasant or repugnant.  Is 
this not the heart of the issue involved, a conflict in human claims of 
high dimension . . . [?]”319  On this view, Brown was a conflict of rights, 
with no principled basis for judicial resolution. 
Wechsler was wrong, but it is important to say why.  To call the right 
sought by black students and parents “freedom of association” misses 
the Jim Crow laws’ meaning for their text.320  But that is not to say 
Brown did not present a conflict of rights.  Supporters of segregation 
did indeed believe their freedom of association was at stake,321 and they 
had a prima facie right to protect that freedom through the law.322  The 
problem is that, in this instance, that right was invested with racial an-
imus and conflicted with the far stronger rights of their fellow citizens 
to equal treatment.  It is perfectly sensible — and judicially managea-
ble — for the positive constitutional law of a jurisdiction to privilege 
rights of equal treatment, especially on the basis of race and especially 
at scale, over rights of association.  That is just what the Brown Court 
did, without saying so.  But to deny that any associational interests are 
at issue at all invites just the Wechsler response: an accusation of un-
principled decisionmaking. 
Wechsler saw very clearly, and with trepidation, that in order for 
modern constitutional law to move beyond the deference regime encap-
sulated in United States v. Carolene Products, it would have to resolve 
value conflicts.323  It faces three basic options in the face of such con-
flicts.  First, it can stand down and let the democratic process play out.  
This was Wechsler’s answer: “When no sufficient reasons of this kind 
can be assigned for overturning value choices of the other branches of 
the Government or of a state, those choices must, of course, survive.”324  
Second, it can assume away any conflict.  This is the modern Court’s 
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answer.  Third, it can acknowledge the interests on all sides and none-
theless resolve the conflict.  This is proportionality. 
The disjunction between rights and justice that rights as trumps en-
courages makes some sense of the surprising lack of any constitutional 
duty on the part of the government to protect its citizens from private 
violence.  The Supreme Court has affirmed with admirable clarity that 
there is no such duty.325  And yet we not unreasonably tend to conceive 
of our interest in physical safety in rights terms, whether as a natural 
entitlement to security or as part of a solemn bargain as law-abiding and 
taxpaying members of a political community.326  Conceiving of such 
rights as absolute would put on the table arguments for a radical judicial 
reordering of budgetary priorities and local government law.327  The 
infeasibility of that outcome should not, however — and does not logi-
cally — carry with it the dystopian corollary that the state bears no 
constitutional responsibility to its citizens at all.328 
2.  Judicial Subterfuge. — Rights as trumps obscures the stakes of 
constitutional conflict not just by substantively ignoring or erasing in-
convenient constitutional values but also by slipping those values into 
ill-fitting garments.  Consider Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, 
Inc.329  The Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) offers specialty 
license plates to drivers, who may choose among an assortment of de-
signs that have met the approval of its Board.330  The state division of 
the Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) submitted a design that in-
cluded an image of the Confederate battle flag.331  The Board rejected 
the design and the SCV sued, claiming a violation of its freedom of 
speech.332 
The DMV discriminated against the SCV on the basis of viewpoint.  
The DMV Board did not approve of the message the rebel flag embod-
ied, or perhaps feared the reactions of others who might disapprove, and 
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so it refused to permit a design including that message.333  As presently 
understood, the First Amendment almost never permits the government 
to discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.334  And yet the State won, in 
a 5–4 decision that improbably united Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.335  How? 
Put to one side the legally correct outcome in the case, about which 
reasonable minds can (and did) differ, and consider instead where first 
principles might lead.  Ritual incantation of “viewpoint discrimination” 
fails to capture the complexity of the case.  The State’s relationship  
to the Confederate “message” is ambiguous — Texas celebrates  
Confederate Heroes Day as a state holiday every January 19, and a vis-
itor to the state capitol can buy replica stars and bars in the gift 
shop336 — and so one might reasonably question why the SCV was sin-
gled out.  The SCV has a substantial interest in freedom of expression, 
but its speech was not of particularly high value.  It was not, in context, 
intended to contribute to political debate (or so the SCV claimed337), 
though the possibility that others would perceive the message as having 
political content is inarguable.  More importantly, the sanction here — 
denial of state license plate real estate — was not exactly pillory and the 
stocks.  Above all, perhaps, Texas was once a Confederate state, and the 
message the flag conveys — to some, and reasonably — is advocacy of 
treason in the name of racial subordination. 
Rights as trumps makes it difficult for an adjudicator to appreciate 
these nuances.  Viewpoint discrimination is equally unconstitutional no 
matter the content of the message, and First Amendment law is remark-
ably insensitive to the nature of the sanction.338  But to escape the strict-
est scrutiny requires a leap into some doctrinal space that blinds itself 
entirely to the legitimate speech interests in the case and the somewhat 
suspicious way in which Texas curtailed them here.  The frame the U.S. 
approach encourages is prone to devastating hypotheticals from both 
directions.  What if an applicant wanted to display a dismembered fetus, 
or a burning cross, or a swastika (Justice Ginsburg’s example at oral 
argument)?339  Ah, but what if the government permitted Republican 
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messages but not Democratic ones (Justice Kagan’s example at oral  
argument)?340 
The actual majority opinion in the Walker case sought refuge in the 
government speech doctrine.  Government speech is not restricted — at 
all — by the First Amendment in its ability to engage in content or 
viewpoint discrimination.341  What this rubric gained in convenience it 
lost in credibility, however, and Justice Alito made quick work of it in 
dissent.  The DMV had approved specialty plates with the names of 
dozens of private organizations, with favorite soft drinks and burgers, 
with state colleges from other states, with a tribute to the NASCAR 
driver (and native Californian) Jeff Gordon, and with whimsical slogans 
such as “Rather Be Golfing.”342  To call these license plates “government 
speech” is to stretch the category beyond recognition.  But under current 
doctrine, not to do so would have meant that Texas must either permit 
swastikas or abandon its specialty license plate program. 
The sleight of hand the Walker majority performed is endemic to 
U.S. constitutional law.  Section II.A.1 above discusses the breakdown 
of the tiers-of-scrutiny regime in disability and affirmative action cases.  
The same has occurred in cases implicating the rights of gays and lesbi-
ans, where there has been much hand-wringing over the standard of 
review the Court is applying.343  Outside of antidiscrimination law, cross 
burning, abortion clinic protests, and refusals to accommodate religious 
organizations have routinely been shoehorned into categories that do not 
match.344  When the boxes that structure American constitutional law 
do not fit or would lead to inconvenient outcomes, judges (consciously 
or not) grab hold of the closest one that will do.  Wechsler’s critique goes 
as much to this practice as it does to proportionality, but it misses what 
his contemporary Professor Alexander Bickel saw more clearly: the  
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alternative to “unprincipled” — I prefer “particularist” — judicial deci-
sionmaking is not simply principled decisionmaking; it is as often abdi-
cation of judicial review.345 
C.  Political Constitutionalism 
It is common for public law scholars to lament the demise of any 
serious ethic of political constitutionalism in U.S. constitutional dis-
course.  These calls typically promote the capacity of legislatures or 
agencies either to attend to the popular engagement or to perform the 
moral deliberation that, on these accounts, rights discourse demands.  
Some are in the “popular constitutionalist” mode, emphasizing the con-
stitutional judgments that reside within nonjudicial political and social 
institutions.346  Thus, Professor Jeremy Waldron faults the U.S. mode of 
judicial review for devolving rights identification to the distracted mo-
dalities of judicial opinions.347  Professors Robert Post and Reva Siegel 
distinguish the Court’s regnant “enforcement” model of Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from a “policentric” approach that imagines 
Congress as implementing views about rights that reside within the con-
stitutional culture.348  Professor Cass Sunstein finds judicial minimalism 
especially useful when it serves to “promote political accountability and 
political deliberation.”349 
Another, dovetailing critique emerges from a critical legal studies 
(CLS) tradition that views rights as dampening or distracting from pro-
gressive politics and undermining the bonds of social solidarity.   
Professor Mark Tushnet views rights as unstable, indeterminate, and 
often useless or worse.350  Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger de-
scribes as a “dirty little secret[]” of contemporary jurisprudence a  
“discomfort with democracy” evident in, for example: 
the ceaseless identification of restraints upon majority rule, rather than of 
restraints upon the power of dominant minorities, as the overriding respon-
sibility of judges and jurists . . . [and] opposition to all institutional reforms, 
particularly those designed to heighten the level of popular political engage-
ment, as threats to a regime of rights.351 
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That regime, as Professor Robin West describes, is not always “come-
dic,” but has significant elements of tragedy, of individuals “who want 
very much to connect in meaningful ways with others, but who find 
those desires for connection frustrated” by a liberal, individualistic 
rights culture.352 
The challenge these projects confront is not simply to describe how 
rights are articulated within an explicitly political discourse.  It is also 
to account for the separation between judicial and political constitution-
alism that has developed over time.  The root of declining constitutional 
conscience within the political branches does not lie just in the Court’s 
self-aggrandizing pretensions of judicial supremacy353 or, as Professor 
Keith Whittington has suggested, in the strategic self-interest of political 
actors.354  It lies as well in the way in which judges and others within 
the constitutional culture conceptualize rights. 
Understanding rights as trumps limits political actors’ points of entry 
into adjudication.  Constitutional law becomes less about the particulars 
of the government’s behavior, the acts it passes, the players’ motiva-
tions, the evidence the legislature or agencies gather, or the policy objec-
tives they pursue, and more about the abstracted right the government 
is alleged to have violated.  The contours of that right are treated as 
predetermined by text, structure, history, and precedent, its contact with 
the imperatives of modern life artificially severed.  Shifting policy goals, 
updated empirical investigation, or renewed moral or political delibera-
tion — in short, the things democratic actors do — are only interstitially 
relevant to the scope and substance of rights within such a regime.  
“Rights” become solely the province of judges; when identified, the gov-
ernment loses unless its “interests” are especially compelling or im-
portant and its laws or practices well tailored to those interests.  One 
should expect any political institutional capacity for developing consti-
tutional rights to atrophy in such an environment, and it has. 
The idea that rights are not a proper subject of politics is deeply felt, 
but misguided.  As section IV.B discusses below, it is quite opposite the 
predominant view of rights both at the U.S. constitutional founding and 
during Reconstruction.  We tend not to question the pathological roots 
of the proposition that the political branches cannot be trusted to protect 
the rights of those who are not in power.355  Proportionality’s emphasis 
on justification and instrumental rationality can accommodate mistrust, 
but it does so in a way that is consistent with the proposition that, in a 
pluralistic environment, rights are destined to be in tension with each 
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other.  Politics is the place where the citizens of a mature democracy 
negotiate that tension. 
D.  Relational Injury 
The consequences of the rights-as-trumps frame are not limited to 
bloodless doctrinal formulae, or even to substantive constitutional deci-
sions.  Recall Dworkin’s view that an African American student has a 
right not to have race used against him in admissions to the University 
of Washington Law School, but that Marco DeFunis had no such 
right.356  A dual commitment to rights as trumps and to the constitu-
tional validity of race-based affirmative action requires this conclusion.  
No Supreme Court Justice has ever argued that rational basis review is 
appropriate in cases of race-based affirmative action,357 but for clarity 
of argument let us assume that, in some Socratic sense, Dworkin is cor-
rect about DeFunis’s rights, or lack thereof. 
This proposition communicates to DeFunis not simply that he has 
lost but that he does not matter.358  Much is at stake when constitutional 
law tells people who advance reasonable rights claims that they have no 
rights the law is bound to respect.359  For one thing, this legal posture 
affects how the parties relate to each other.  If the University owes noth-
ing to DeFunis, it has no incentive beyond the mechanics of electoral 
accountability to moderate its practices to accommodate his interests.  It 
need not negotiate with similarly situated citizens except insofar as those 
citizens have the power, in line with their compatriots, to effect demo-
cratic change.  Awarding a broader array of prima facie rights would 
help to vindicate the insight, memorialized in footnote four of United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.,360 that because we protect our rights 
through ordinary politics, the role of courts is to ensure that those poli-
tics are amenable to mutual accommodation.361  The use of adjudicatory 
tools that force politics is even more significant when decisionmaking 
bodies operate subject to relatively weak mechanisms of political ac-
countability such as those governing admissions officers or law enforce-
ment personnel. 
A second relational consequence of telling those holding plausible 
constitutional rights claims that such claims are not even prima facie 
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valid is that it places us in an adversarial rather than a cooperative 
posture vis-à-vis other members of the polity.362  If my assertion of rights 
depends strictly on your lack thereof, and vice versa, it is natural for me 
to see you not as a friend whose different commitments must be recon-
ciled with mine but rather as an enemy who is, in too real a sense, out 
to destroy me.  In making judges the gatekeepers of political member-
ship rather than simply the adjudicators of disputes, the categorical 
frame tends to raise rather than lower the stakes of politics.363  Losers 
come to see their political charge as producing a sea change sufficient to 
overwhelm or marginalize the position of the median Justice, or else 
replace him or her entirely. 
Recall Masterpiece Cakeshop.  We have already chronicled some of 
the polemical ways in which the Justices framed the case at oral argu-
ment.  The briefs by both the parties and the amici are likewise littered 
with slippery slope arguments that purport to demonstrate the dystopian 
universe the other side’s position contemplates and invites.  If those 
briefs are to be believed, a holding in favor of the same-sex couple, Craig 
and Mullins, would mean that “the compelled speech doctrine would 
cease to exist,”364 that the Thirteenth Amendment would be violated,365 
and that the government could “compel attendance at religious ritu-
als.”366  It could disbar Christian lawyers and strip Christian doctors of 
their medical licenses.367  It could force Jehovah’s Witness children to 
salute the flag, or force Virginia Baptists to pay to support mainstream 
Christian teaching.368  It would be consistent with the Spanish  
Inquisition,369 akin to forcing Christians to bow before Roman gods,370 
to forcing Jews to submit to the golden statue of Nebuchadnezzar,371 to 
the beheading of Sir Thomas More for refusing to affirm the annulment 
of Henry VIII’s marriage to Catherine of Aragon and sign the Oath of 
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Succession confirming Anne Boleyn’s place as Queen of England.372  As 
one brief put it, “the gay marriage movement ‘has moved from tolerance 
to totalitarianism.’”373 
A win for Phillips, the baker, would likewise be dismal (though per-
haps not equally so) according to the briefs in support of the  
couple.  Arguments of Phillips’s sort have been used “to justify anti- 
miscegenation laws”374 and “school segregation.”375  “Landlords could 
refuse to rent to interracial couples, employers could refuse to hire 
women or pay them less than men, and a bus line could refuse to drive 
women to work . . . .”376  “[A] racist baker could refuse to sell ‘Happy 
Birthday’ cakes to African-American customers, a screen printer could 
refuse to sell a banner announcing a Muslim family’s reunion, and a 
tailor could refuse to sell a gay man a custom suit for a charity gala.”377  
“[A] family portrait studio could enforce a ‘No Mexicans’ policy.  A ban-
quet hall could refuse to host events for Jewish people.  A hair salon 
could turn away a lesbian woman who wants a new hair style”378 or 
refuse to help a teenage girl prepare for her quinceañera out of opposi-
tion to Mexican immigration.379 
Of course, lawyers in an adversarial system often characterize their 
opponents’ cases in negative terms.  The categorical frame does not cre-
ate this practice.380  But in denying both courts and litigants any re-
sources for moderating the potential reach of their claims, it almost  
requires it.  Lawyering of this sort is both interpersonally alienating and 
misleading.  The objection to slippery slope arguments of this kind mir-
rors successful hermeneutic objections to original intent arguments in 
the 1980s.381  Placing oneself into the decisional posture of a long-ago 
historical actor requires leaps of imagination that corrupt the exercise.  
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A society that permits the beheading of religious dissenters or that pro-
hibits interracial marriage is one whose legal, political, and social norms 
are so different from our own that performing the hypothetical is not a 
controlled experiment.  The social meaning of practices that people do 
not in fact engage in is different from the meaning of practices they 
engage in pervasively. 
The benefit of proportionality done well is to force litigants and their 
fellow citizens to match their claims to this world, and to acknowledge 
the mutual and legitimate presence within it of others who hold contrary 
values and commitments.  On this view, constitutional law should seek 
not to police the boundaries of the political community but rather to 
structure politics so that those within that community are able to see, 
hear, and speak to each other. 
A darker conception of the nature of the political is available, indeed 
familiar.  Carl Schmitt famously described politics as grounded in the 
distinction between friend and enemy.382  For Schmitt, what defines a 
group as a political community as opposed to a community aligned 
along some substantive set of commitments is that its members conceive 
of outsiders as enemies and are willing to fight for the group’s preserva-
tion.383  In conspicuously sequestering rights, presumptively absolute, 
from interests, which are of no constitutional concern, the rights-as-
trumps frame invites us to understand political communities in 
Schmittian terms, where political conflict is, in its nature, existential.  
Our constitutional fate might well lie in Schmittian democracy,384 but 
whether the judicial branch hastens or arrests that development is a 
choice. 
As damaging as the adversarial relation the rights-as-trumps frame 
encourages among citizens is the distance it enforces between individual 
rights claimants and the constitutional system itself.  As Professor  
Robert Cover once suggested in these pages, we all hold dear our own 
constitutions in exile.385  Abolitionists such as Lysander Spooner and 
Frederick Douglass imagined a constitutional law that prohibited (or at 
least did not support) chattel slavery.386  Suffragists such as Virginia 
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Minor and Susan B. Anthony viewed the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments as giving women the right to vote.387  Progressive Era la-
bor advocates saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a right to strike and 
to bargain collectively.388  Charles Hamilton Houston, Thurgood  
Marshall, and their soldiers-in-arms saw an end to separate but equal 
schools and public accommodations.  The National Rifle Association 
saw an individual right to bear arms hiding in plain sight in the  
words of the Second Amendment.  Modern libertarians heap scorn on  
Williamson v. Lee Optical389 and modern progressives give like treat-
ment to Citizens United. 
These alternative constitutional visions do not represent sour grapes 
or bad faith so much as a shadow constitutional law, a coherent set of 
normative orderings that await the social and political conditions 
needed to summon them from the front (or even the back) bench.  Any 
pluralistic society will include, indeed will be constituted by, a mosaic 
of competing and contested visions of constitutional meaning and appli-
cation.  In Cover’s evocative, Foucauldian terms, decisional law is fun-
damentally jurispathic, seeking to kill off these alternatives and rein-
force the state’s monopoly on coercive authority.390  But Cover 
emphasizes that there are more and less final ways of doing so.  Leaving 
alternative visions of the constitutional good the space — some space — 
to flower and to cultivate responses to the current regime is necessary if 
we are to reconcile justice with law’s immanent violence.391 
The early CLS critics of rights were concerned with law’s jurispathic 
tendencies, but they generally lacked the benefit of any practical expo-
sure to alternative technologies of rights adjudication.  Foreign court 
experiences with proportionality were nascent and not in wide circula-
tion among judges and scholars.  So long as we take the business of 
courts to be declaring the substance and reach of rights, as the rights-
as-trumps ideology envisions, the inadequacies of rights that CLS critics 
identified translate quite directly into the inadequacies of courts.  The 
most trenchant pushback against that critique, from critical race and 
feminist legal theorists who emphasized the differential importance of 
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rights to the agency of dispossessed people relative to white men,392 in 
turn becomes a defense of courts taking rights just as seriously as 
Dworkin urged.  We see a similar dynamic between judicial minimalists 
and their critics.393  A frame that nests rights in opposition to majori-
tarianism structures a further set of oppositions that keep the law re-
views busy but are short on consensus.394 
Proportionality invites parties with a diverse set of commitments to 
remain invested in the constitutional system rather than alienated from 
it.395  It assures them that if they do not win today, they might win 
tomorrow on different facts.  That assurance can be subversive in seek-
ing to submit a totalitarian or white supremacist state to basic human 
rights law.  But it is indispensable where the paradigm case is one of 
reasonable, good faith disagreement over the scope of individual rights 
and government powers. 
This Foreword presents a proportionality frame as an aspiration for 
judicial review within a mature constitutional democracy.  There are 
two related propositions that it is important to disclaim before moving 
forward.  First, to say that rights as trumps is ill-suited to retail denials 
of rights is not to say that proportionality is necessarily ill-suited to 
wholesale denials.  Indeed, as Part V discusses in the context of specific 
cases, proportionality and the remedial discretion that often accompa-
nies it can in some instances further a court’s resolve in addressing such 
denials.  Second, to say that rights as trumps contributes to social alien-
ation and political polarization is not to say that it is the sole or even a 
significant cause, nor is it to say that proportionality will substantially 
alleviate these ills.  Indeed, the prevailing polarization itself likely con-
tributes to the rights-as-trumps instinct, producing a cycle from which 
escape will be challenging.  But even if judicial method plays a minor 
role in our relational problems, aspirational thinking remains valuable 
here, as for normative legal scholarship more generally.  As Dworkin 
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once said of constitutional interpretation, the only alternative to aiming 
at happy endings is to aim at unhappy ones.396 
E.  The Costs of Proportionality 
Proportionality is not perfect, still less in practice than in theory.  It 
has been blamed for lawlessness in Brazilian courts;397 for a too-casual 
attitude toward the rights of minorities, as for example in religious free-
dom cases arising out of France, Italy, and Turkey;398 and more gener-
ally for blurring the line between law and politics, especially at the final 
balancing stage.399  This section discusses some of these costs and de-
fends the place of proportionality in modern systems of judicial review, 
including the United States. 
1.  Proportionality as Construction. — To the degree proportionality 
is associated with rights inflation, it relates uncomfortably to what were 
once referred to as “interpretivist” methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion and construction.  These methods view constitutional interpretation 
as grounded in an excavation of legal meaning from the text, structure, 
and history of the Constitution rather than in more dynamic or prag-
matic methods that weigh precedent, practical consequences, or assess-
ments of modern values more heavily in deciding constitutional  
questions.400 
This objection, such as it is, is simply a restatement of the problem.  
That is, the project is just to expose the tension between the categorical 
frame’s marriage to interpretivist methods and the role constitutional 
courts play in modern democratic governance.  Still, the objection has 
real force within U.S. constitutional culture.  To someone committed — 
whatever the reason — to the view that the Constitution’s meaning and 
application are fairly well specified by its historically determined text 
and structure, and also that that meaning is discoverable and binds 
judges, the Foreword’s project is poorly conceived.  It mounts a conse-
quentialist challenge to a deontological ethic.401 
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The Supreme Court has never viewed rights adjudication so nar-
rowly.  The Court has long adopted a presumptively originalist posture 
in cases of first impression having to do with relatively specific struc-
tural provisions,402 but it has never viewed constitutional rights through 
the kind of originalist lens that would resist transsubstantive propor-
tionality analysis.  In equal protection, fundamental rights, free speech, 
and criminal procedure cases alike, the Court has relied on heuristics 
and balancing tests derived through common law iteration rather than 
textual analysis.403  The Court’s refusal to recognize certain rights has 
often been grounded in the kinds of pragmatic concerns that proportion-
ality would help to allay,404 but rarely has its austerity in identifying 
new rights been rooted simply in respect for the Constitution’s text, 
structure, and history. 
It is true that some scholars and the occasional judge have gestured 
at the kind of narrow textualist originalism that would jettison existing 
rights precedents.405  Many modern originalists, however, adopt a dis-
tinction between the practice of gauging the semantic meaning of legal 
terms and the practice of adjudicating or otherwise resolving conflicts 
that are constrained but not determined by those terms.  Professors 
Keith Whittington, Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett, and Lawrence Solum, 
among others, have described the former as “interpretation” and the  
latter as “construction.”406  Relatedly, Professor Christopher Green has 
emphasized the sense-reference distinction, which, derived from the phi-
losophy of language, distinguishes the meaning a word expresses from 
the outcomes it accomplishes through that expression.407  One detects 
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an echo to the difference between what a word connotes and what it 
denotes, a Millian idea that the High Court of Australia has been known 
to deploy to prevent its own well-known originalism from becoming an 
interpretive straitjacket.408 
These strategies seek to preserve the relevance of textualist original-
ism to a Constitution whose original meaning can be fixed at only a 
broad level of generality.  As a matter of original textual meaning, an 
American has no less a right to feed pigeons in a square than to use birth 
control, have an abortion, marry, or attend a racially integrated public 
school.  Which is to say that refusing to recognize pigeon-feeding claims 
results from consequentialist considerations of administrability, value 
judgments about the worth of the activity, historical arguments about 
judicial precedents, and so forth, not from the text and history of the 
Constitution.  Proportionality analysis brings these kinds of considera-
tions to bear forthrightly.  It indeed may be redescribed as a stepwise, 
transsubstantive framework for constitutional construction.  Buying 
into proportionality requires the lawyer, scholar, judge, or citizen to con-
cede that the Constitution’s text gives scant instruction as to how rights 
may be limited.  It does not require him or her to disclaim that the 
Constitution limits the rights we have or to deny that some constitu-
tional rights may be burdened more than others. 
2.  Rights and Interests. — Proportionality has drawn criticism for 
failing to distinguish rights from mere interests.  Professor Grégoire 
Webber argues, for example, that proportionality analysis disaggregates 
rights from justice, and in doing so alters the suite of duties and obliga-
tions that rights supply.409  What a community owes its rights-bearers 
in virtue of having a right is a question of justice, grounded in the moral 
equality of humans.410  Treating rights as trumps ensures that we treat 
them righteously,411 that we affirm them even in the face of compelling 
arguments for interference.412 
This perspective suffers from an epistemic problem that Professor 
Waldron succinctly articulates: “There are many of us, and we disagree 
about justice.”413  And not just that.  In the usual case, that disagreement 
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is reasonable and in good faith.  “It is not,” Waldron writes in Law and 
Disagreement, “a case of there being some of us who are in possession 
of the truth about rights — a truth which our opponents wilfully or 
irrationally fail to acknowledge because they are blinded by ignorance, 
prejudice or interest.”414  Rather, he offers, “[t]he issues that rights im-
plicate . . . are simply hard questions — matters on which reasonable 
people differ.”415  In Law and Disagreement and elsewhere, Waldron 
marshals the fact of reasonable, good-faith disagreement about rights 
against what he describes as “American-style judicial review,”416 the 
subject and target of this Foreword.  He does not believe that the insti-
tution of judicial review has much to recommend it in resolving conflicts 
over rights in a functioning, rights-respecting democracy, given that the 
varying moral and philosophical commitments that divide citizens over 
rights also divide judges and direct their opinions.417 
One need not adopt Waldron’s skepticism about judicial review tout 
court to believe that his insight carries serious implications for the prac-
tice of judicial review.  Constitutional adjudication is a decision proce-
dure for resolving disagreements implicating rights, but it is not the 
best — or even a good — decision procedure for getting at the underly-
ing truth of the matter.  As Waldron emphasizes, judges resolve rights 
disputes in just the way their training and comparative expertise recom-
mend: not through philosophical analysis or moral inspection but 
through the bloodless jargon of precedents and doctrinal tests.418  The 
distinctly legalistic way in which judges purport to resolve rights dis-
putes has its advantages, but — and here’s the point — helping society 
to distinguish rights from interests is not one of them. 
We can assume there is value in distinguishing rights from interests 
without assuming that doing so is the judiciary’s predominant task.  In-
deed, one way of describing the enduring difference between rights as 
trumps and a proportionality framework is that the former tends to  
assimilate rights adjudication to the existential question of whether an 
individual claims a right or an interest, whereas the latter reserves judg-
ment on the weight of the interest until the final stage of adjudication.  
If and when the proportionality court reaches that final stage of balanc-
ing in the strict sense, it may be empowered to assess the weight of the 
interest directly rather than through the smoke of precedent and doctri-
nal formulae.  And so rights as trumps front-loads questions of rights 
definition that judges, justifiably fearful of their own capacity and legit-
imacy, address mechanistically.  Practiced well, proportionality does not 
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avoid those questions altogether but back-loads them, reserving a con-
stitutional court’s primary analysis for empirical questions that lend 
themselves to the kind of dispassionate inquiry to which judges are in-
deed better suited than are politicians. 
3.  The Perils of Transparency. — A third significant criticism of pro-
portionality cuts somewhat against the grain of the last.  It is that  
proportionality is a bit too on the nose.  Forcing arguments about rights 
into boxes that cannot accommodate the messiness of modern life but 
that seem to lend themselves to juridification enables a constitutional 
culture to maintain the fiction of a depoliticized judiciary.  On this view, 
it is just because judges seem to bring an elite lawyer’s toolkit to rights 
disputes that we rely upon them to defuse those disputes.  Proportion- 
ality instead requires judges more forthrightly to mimic the decisional 
processes of legislatures, which risks decreasing the legitimacy of courts 
and undermining their dispute resolution capacity.  The opiate of the 
masses is not religion on this view, but law. 
I must take this criticism seriously not least because it appears to 
implicate some of my own previous work.419  Constitutional judges 
need, in Professor Neil Siegel’s formulation, to safeguard the conditions 
of their own legitimacy.420  When such judges write opinions and issue 
judgments, they have a duty to offer reasoned arguments articulated in 
the conventional language of constitutional discourse.421  The case must 
draw, to varying degrees, on constitutional text, structure, history, pre- 
cedent, or prudential judgment rather than, say, on partisan politics, the 
judge’s personal financial stakes, Zen sutras, or the drawing of lots.  But 
I have emphasized that judicial duty extends beyond simply the form 
the opinion takes; judges also have a duty to try to persuade colleagues 
on the bench, the parties to the case, public officials, and the citizenry 
more generally that what they are doing is consistent with their role.422  
Attending to the forms of argument is designed to serve that end, but it 
should not be confused with the end itself.423 
In short, judges have to exaggerate or obfuscate sometimes.424   
Professor Charles Black gestured in this direction in his discussion of 
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Justice Black, the Justice most associated with the idea of rights as 
trumps.  In his inaugural James Madison Lecture at New York  
University School of Law in 1960, Justice Black had argued that “there 
are ‘absolutes’” in the Bill of Rights, “and that they were put there on 
purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohi-
bitions to be ‘absolutes.’”425  Like many of his contemporaries in the 
academy and at the bar,426 Professor Black was skeptical (in a way) of 
this claim.  The determination of what counts as a right in the first place 
requires some balancing,427 and in any event, “[n]o right, however de-
fined, ever turns out to be really ‘absolute,’ if you think about it long 
enough.”428  The point was obvious — Dworkin, too, conceded it429 — 
but it led Professor Black to reason that what was really at stake in the 
Justice’s posture was not the substance of rights but rather what he 
called “attitude.”430  He wrote: 
On the whole it seems clear . . . that the man who prefers to look on the Bill 
of Rights guarantees, once they are defined, as “absolutes” will see them  
as more broadly defined and enforce them with more resolution than will 
the man who prefers to stress their character as invitations to start  
“balancing.”431 
For Professor Black, whether Justice Black was truly being mislead-
ing in professing that rights are absolute depended on “where we want 
to be led.”432  There is value in a posture of viewing rights as not merely 
convenient, and indeed the Bill of Rights is faithfully read as embodying 
that value.433 
There is likewise value, Professor Black emphasized, in insisting that 
judges and not just legislatures play a critical role in upholding the pro-
tections of the Bill of Rights.  “To insist upon generalizing the ‘balan- 
cing’ process, and extending it beyond the stage of definition,” Professor 
Black wrote, “will tend to force the Court to abdicate its protective role, 
under the guise of deference to the legislative branch.”434  Affirming the 
significance of constitutional rights and affirming the Court’s role in 
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identifying those rights, both vital to the Court’s safeguarding of its le-
gitimacy, might require some loose talk about the nature and scope of 
rights themselves.  Rights are not, of course, absolute in a sense of “im-
agined chemical purity,”435 but Justice Black’s call was not for utopian-
ism but “for a feasible program of thought and action.”436 
Judges must persuade citizens that courts are needed and worth lis-
tening to.  Doing so might at times require them to gloss over the fact 
of continuity between their task and the tasks of elected officials and 
administrators.  At times.  At other times, preserving the legitimacy of 
courts might require other strategies.  Where we “want[ed] to be led” in 
the early 1960s, when Justice Black and Professor Black were writing, 
might well be different from where we want to be led today.  Justice 
Black’s lecture centered, in full, on the dangers that motivated the fram-
ers of the Bill of Rights, “the ancient evils which forced their ancestors 
to flee to this new country” and “the dangers of tyrannical governments” 
that they “knew firsthand.”437  Let us grant that many of the dangers to 
rights with which a jurist in 1960 might reasonably have been con-
cerned — the apartheid conditions of the Jim Crow South, McCarthyite 
Communist purges, kangaroo criminal trials that presaged the revolu-
tion in constitutional criminal procedure — amount to the kind of op-
pression that bears a family resemblance to that with which the framers 
were familiar. 
We might yet maintain that “tyranny” is simply not at stake in as-
sessing the residual affirmative action program at the University of 
Texas at Austin,438 or a law restricting corporate electioneering in the 
two months before a general election to funds generated through a po-
litical action committee,439 or a measure requiring a trigger lock on long 
arms held within the sixty-one square miles of the nation’s capital.440  
Whether or not one agrees with laws of this sort, whether or not one 
thinks them constitutionally prohibited, they represent the workaday 
products of democratic governance.  If challenges to these legislative 
acts describe paradigmatic rights conflicts, then it is not at all obvious 
that we should want to be “led” to the attitude of skepticism toward the 
government that Professor Black rightly identifies with rights absolut-
ism.441  Not because government regulation is good as such, but because 
we live in a society that we expect, in the first instance, to govern itself.  
The judiciary’s role in that setting is to take both government and rights 
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seriously.  Whether it does so successfully is a reasonable measure of its 
legitimacy. 
Diffuse public support for courts is notoriously difficult to disaggre-
gate from public support for specific decisions.442  We soldier on, though, 
and available data does not support the notion that proportionality ju-
risprudence delegitimates courts or would necessarily do so in the 
United States.  A 2011 study by Professors James Gibson and Gregory 
Caldeira found, for example, that Americans do not generally subscribe 
to the myth of mechanical jurisprudence, and that the institutional le-
gitimacy of the Supreme Court does not depend on assuming the ab-
sence of discretion, so long as judges are principled in exercising it.443  
That finding tends to confirm earlier studies suggesting that, across nu-
merous jurisdictions around the globe, knowledge of high courts, and 
by assumption, exposure to their standard modes of adjudication, cor-
relates positively with support for them.444  More generally, studies of 
diffuse public support for the constitutional or apex courts of jurisdic-
tions that practice proportionality as a matter of course, such as Canada 
and Germany, do not report substantial differences from support for the 
U.S. Supreme Court among the American public.445 
That said, to the degree relative alignment between judicial and po-
litical modes of decisionmaking proves disquieting to judicial review, 
that is as it should be.  If most rights disputes are between parties who 
disagree reasonably and in good faith about the reach of constitutional 
rights, then most such disputes should be determined through overtly 
political processes.446  The insight is continuous with that of Professor 
Ely, who argued that judges should intervene when, and to the degree 
that, the political process is not deserving of trust.447  He grounded his 
view in observations about the process values he believed the U.S.  
Constitution protected as a matter of positive law and in the  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 442 See James L. Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 
47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 357 (2003). 
 443 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the 
U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213 (2011). 
 444 James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
343, 350, 356 (1998). 
 445 Compare Gibson et al., supra note 442, at 364–65 (noting the high degree of institutional le-
gitimacy perceived at the U.S. Supreme Court), with Joseph F. Fletcher & Paul Howe, Canadian 
Attitudes Toward the Charter and the Courts in Comparative Perspective, 6 CHOICES 4, 15–16 
(2000) (comparing data from Gibson et al., supra note 444, with new data on Canada and finding 
the level of support in Canada similar, if not greater), and Vanessa A. Baird, Building Institutional 
Legitimacy: The Role of Procedural Justice, 54 POL. RES. Q. 333, 341–42, 351–52 (2001) (similar for 
Germany). 
 446 See WALDRON, supra note 29, at 243–44. 
 447 See ELY, supra note 47, at 102–03. 
  
2018] THE SUPREME COURT — FOREWORD 93 
institutional capacity of judges, which he associated with regulation of 
procedure.448 
But generations of political thought and common experience have 
demonstrated that the threats to regular political order do not come 
solely from the pathologies that Ely, drawing on footnote four of United 
States v. Carolene Products, identified449: blockages of the channels of 
political change or “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”450  
Anonymous and diffuse majorities might be unable to form the coali-
tions or register the intensity of preference needed to capture the atten-
tion of legislators.451  National party polarization might nullify the 
checks and balances designed to hem in an extreme legislative program 
or executive initiative.452  Well-organized lobbyists and wealthy donors 
can dominate the legislative agenda out of proportion to their represen-
tation in the population.  Political actors can simply make errors in 
measuring certain social facts or in recognizing their constitutional sig-
nificance.  The presence of these kinds of slippages in representative 
politics may not call for the placing of the political process in judicial 
receivership,453 but it calls for a kind of qualified vigilance designed to 
protect minorities and majorities alike in the exercise of their rights.454 
And so transparency is indeed a promise of proportionality.455  Ra-
ther than placing our hands on each other’s jugulars, alienating us from 
politics or else giving those politics a Schmittian cast, proportionality at 
its best helps us to see when a dispute is better resolved through politics 
than through juridification.  The true risk to the legitimacy of the Court 
would be if, sensitive to the political dimensions apparent in its consti-
tutional docket, it were to insist on categorical adjudication or blunt 
judicial remedies.  The costs in legitimacy are the wages of self- 
understanding. 
4.  Lower Court Guidance. — The most significant theoretical con-
cern with importing proportionality jurisprudence into U.S. courts stems 
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from the nature of the Supreme Court as an apex court within a system 
of highly decentralized constitutional jurisdiction.456  It is tempting to 
map categorical versus proportionality frameworks onto the two leading 
models of constitutional jurisdiction.  Both lower federal courts and 
state courts in the United States are empowered to engage in federal 
constitutional review.  This decentralized jurisdiction proceeds from the 
Marbury v. Madison457 conception of judicial review: courts must follow 
the law, including the Constitution, and so they must resolve any incon-
sistency between ordinary and constitutional law that arises in the 
course of adjudication.458  By contrast, under the Kelsenian model dom-
inant in Europe, a specially created constitutional court holds exclusive 
constitutional jurisdiction.459  Insofar as proportionality relies heavily 
on case-by-case adjudication, it gives less guidance to other courts, pub-
lic officials, and citizens than does a categorical approach. 
Lack of guidance, to lower courts especially, is a more serious prob-
lem in a system of decentralized constitutional jurisdiction than in one 
with a centralized constitutional court.  We might think the problem 
more serious still in a federal system, in which relatively uniform federal 
law is the glue that holds the legal system together.  Indeed, the felt need 
to establish uniform federal law is perhaps the most compelling justifi-
cation for the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state 
courts,460 and it remains the leading motivation behind the Court’s cer-
tiorari decisions.461 
This criticism of proportionality is genuine.  Even on the least gen-
erous view of categorical adjudication, one that sees the categories as 
weak approximations that distort constitutional law, the approach 
would retain the benefit of promoting uniformity in the law.  Recall that 
that’s the problem.  The more rule-like and unforgiving the doctrinal 
formulation, the greater the error in subsuming cases the rule does not 
contemplate and the better the law is able to promote uniformity.  Uni-
formity in the law relates positively to the kinds of distortions this  
Foreword singles out as problematic. 
Uniformity, while holding some clear benefits, is neither a trump nor 
even an unvarnished good, however.  Where federal law is certain, “Our 
Federalism” seems to require that it be consistent across states.462  But 
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where federal law is uncertain, it is not obvious, a priori, that some var-
iation in the law across states is undesirable.  Such variation offers the 
usual benefits of legal pluralism.  It can provide data about the conse-
quences or workability of a particular approach to rights, permitting 
states or federal circuits to provide the laboratories of innovation that 
are sometimes said to motivate federalism in the first instance.463 
Relatedly, the Supreme Court tolerates significant disuniformity in 
the law.464  Although its rules for certiorari suggest a concern with divi-
sions of authority among lower courts, it is common for the Court to 
allow circuit splits to “percolate” until multiple courts have weighed in 
on the merits in published opinions that can inform the Court’s reason-
ing.465  The Court’s docket has conspicuously shrunk from routinely 
reaching over 150 cases in the 1980s to fewer than half that number 
today.466  The Court heard arguments in just sixty-three cases in the 
2017 Term,467 fewer than in either of the previous two Terms.468 
It is, in any event, easy to overstate the disuniformity proportionality 
invites.  Proportionality is fully consistent with a devotion to precedent, 
indeed with a dogged insistence that courts be less casual about the level 
of generality with which they approach prior cases.  It better approxi-
mates the common law method than does the categorical frame, for it 
makes relevant the kinds of comparative factual assessments that moti-
vate common law reasoning; like cases are to be treated alike and dif-
ferent cases are to be treated differently.469  It is telling that the Supreme 
Court of Canada is an apex court in a federal system with decentralized 
constitutional jurisdiction that employs proportionality analysis with no 
apparent crisis of disuniformity in federal constitutional law.470 
More broadly, over time, through constant exposure to the lived ex-
perience of constitutional law, we can expect substantial convergence 
between the categorical and proportionality approaches.  Treating like 
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cases alike gives rise to evidentiary presumptions and rules of thumb 
that calcify into an array of ex ante categories.  From the opposite di-
rection, applying ex ante categories to real rather than hypothesized 
facts tends to birth the exceptions, and the exceptions to the exceptions, 
that are familiar, for example, from First and Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence.  Every system combines elements of both categoricalism and 
more ex post approaches.  We can expect proportionality to reach induc-
tively in the direction categoricalism aims for deductively.471 
What happens in the long meantime matters.  For one thing, building 
out rights inductively reflects a humility about judges’ capacity for 
knowledge and forethought that is appropriate in a complex regulatory 
environment.  For another, and following Professor Black, the perspec-
tive from which the convergence begins affects the attitude that courts 
and legal and political elites take toward the constitutional system.  Is 
the baseline attitude that governments are constituted to solve social 
problems so long as they do so reasonably, or is it that rights are imple-
mented to limit government, unless government is necessary?  The latter 
view indeed takes rights seriously, but it thereby encourages judges to 
limit the definition of rights just for the sake of limits rather than in 
response to actual facts about the world. 
All of which is to say that the costs of proportionality, in departing 
from interpretivism, in forcing judges to resolve values conflicts, in fos-
tering legal uncertainty, are simply the costs of judicial review.  Those 
costs can be obscured out of anxiety over the court’s legitimacy, they 
can be assessed and mitigated forthrightly, or we can abandon judicial 
review. 
IV.  THE CONTINGENT ORIGINS OF RIGHTS AS TRUMPS 
In a November 1964 essay published in Harper’s, the historian  
Richard Hofstadter told Americans they were paranoid.  “American  
politics,” he began, “has often been an arena for angry minds.”472  The 
essay, later published as part of an influential book,473 identified in U.S. 
politics across the political spectrum what Hofstadter called a “sense of 
heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy”474 that 
he traced anecdotally across abolitionists, Know Nothings, the anti- 
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Masonry movement, McCarthyites, and “both sides of the race contro-
versy” of the 1960s.475  Hofstadter’s casual conflation of, say, White  
Citizens’ Councils and Black Muslims,476 the paranoia of the oppressor 
and that of the oppressed, less discredits Hofstadter than it reveals the 
truth in the old adage that just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean 
they aren’t out to get you. 
Americans had a fair amount to be paranoid about in the fall of 1964.  
Hofstadter was writing in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
apex of the Cold War and its attendant existential threat.477  President 
Kennedy had been assassinated, no telling by whom exactly, a year be-
fore Hofstadter’s essay.  Less than two decades had passed since the fall 
of the Axis powers.  The Second World War had not only killed some 
seventy million people, including more than 400,000 Americans,478 but 
it had been perpetrated by a regime that was somehow able to mobilize 
millions to participate in an ideologically motivated project of world 
domination and ethnoreligious genocide.  The Nazi puzzle prompted the 
Frankfurt School sociologist Theodor Adorno and his coauthors to seek 
to identify the roots of what they called the “potentially fascistic indi-
vidual.”479  Their Freudian conclusion that such a personality could  
develop out of the kind of “hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitive parent-
child relationship”480 with which many Americans could identify, and 
that a fascist-in-waiting could be activated through a brew of propa-
ganda and economic self-interest,481 was downright terrifying.482 
Black and brown Americans had special reason for both anxiety  
and hope.  Jim Crow was under assault — both the Republican and  
Democratic national convention platforms included antisegregation 
planks in 1960483 — but it remained resilient.484  Freedom Summer had 
just come and gone, and with it the beatings and murders of at least 
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seven civil rights workers and their supporters in Mississippi.  The Civil 
Rights Act passed in the middle of that summer, but its reach and en-
forceability remained uncertain.  Brown v. Board of Education was a 
decade old, but in 1964 only 30,800 of the 2.9 million black schoolchil-
dren in the eleven states of the Deep South attended a school with any 
white classmates.485  Millions of southern blacks remained disenfran-
chised.  Mississippi had been chosen as the site for Freedom Summer 
because, through discriminatory practices and intimidation, only 6.7% 
of its black voting-age population was registered to vote, as opposed to 
70.2% of white voting-age citizens.486 
The criminal justice system remained authoritarian and deeply rac-
ist.  Many of the constitutional protections we associate with the Warren 
Court — Miranda’s487 bar on admissions of confessions obtained  
without an enumeration of the defendant’s rights against self- 
incrimination,488 Brady’s489 requirement that prosecutors disclose excul-
patory evidence in their possession,490 Gideon’s491 assurance that  
indigent state criminal defendants have a right to appointed counsel,492 
and more — had not yet materialized.  The Criminal Justice Act of 
1964,493 which paved the way for a federal public defender system, had 
only just been passed.  Blacks were disproportionate victims of police 
brutality, a major impetus for the Watts riots that terrorized Los Angeles 
five days after the Voting Rights Act was signed into law. 
A.  Griswold, Lochner, and the Right to Privacy 
The fragile state of the world as it looked through the eyes of many 
Americans in the mid-1960s provides important context for the pivotal 
jurisprudential choices that U.S. judges and lawyers would make over 
the decade that followed the publication of Hofstadter’s essay.  The dec-
ade that began with the Civil Rights Act, which effectively ended Jim 
Crow, would also see the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, which 
fundamentally reoriented U.S. politics; second-wave feminism and the 
emergence of the modern women’s movement; the sexual revolution, 
which resulted in wholesale changes in public morality around sex and 
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the family; and the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,494 which 
shifted the demographics of U.S. migration by abolishing statutory pref-
erences for Western Europeans.  It was also in 1964 that Charles Reich 
published The New Property,495 identifying the many ways in which 
individual flourishing depended (newly, so to speak) on government lar-
gesse — from social welfare to government employment, contracts, and 
licensing — which exerted tremendous pressure on traditional bounda-
ries of public and private, and of rights and privileges.496 
The flowering of rights that characterized the era did not just re-
spond to anxiety but also produced it.  The American constitutional im-
agination had never before been so vivid or so threatening.  In a flash, 
and almost simultaneously, appeared the very real possibilities of con-
stitutional rights to substantive racial and sexual equality, to undiluted 
voting and unprecedented judicial supervision of electoral mechanics, 
to a degree of economic equality and public welfare, to abortion on re-
quest, and to restrained interactions with police and prosecutors.  The 
forms of oppression and the levers of inequality that Americans had 
come to associate with ordinary governance were under assault.  It was 
the enlightened despotism of the Rechtsstaat. 
And so consider Griswold v. Connecticut,497 which came down in 
June 1965.  To understand its significance to modern constitutional 
law — and its role in seeding the categorical frame — requires a reck-
oning with what the Griswold majority sought to avoid: Lochner v. New 
York.498 
In Lochner, the Supreme Court invalidated a unanimously passed 
New York law that regulated the working hours of bakers, on the 
ground that it unduly interfered with the bakers’ and bakeries’ freedom 
of contract.499  In broad brushstrokes, at least two criticisms of Lochner 
have emerged.  On one view, the problem is that, in protecting the right 
to freedom of contract, which the Constitution does not specifically enu-
merate, the majority read its own politicized views of healthy economic 
life — Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics and all that — into our 
higher law.500  This criticism aligns roughly with the dissenting opinion 
of Justice Holmes.501  On another view, the problem was not any exalted 
status granted the freedom of contract (which was well established502) 
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but rather the Court’s insufficient respect for the government’s justifi-
cations for the law, which were grounded in the apparent health and 
safety dangers of bakery work.503  This criticism aligns roughly with the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan.504 
Returning to Professor Black’s useful provocation, the Holmes and 
Harlan critiques of Lochner adopt different attitudes toward the New 
York Bakeshop Act.  Justice Holmes barely mentioned the statute or its 
aims; that they did not concern him was just the point.505  Reflecting 
Justice Holmes’s own (somewhat ironic) social Darwinism,506 his opin-
ion announces a theory of jurisprudence: 
[T]he word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is 
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be 
said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute 
proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been under-
stood by the traditions of our people and our law.507 
By contrast, Justice Harlan’s opinion “[g]rant[s]” that “there is a lib-
erty of contract which cannot be violated even under the sanction of 
direct legislative enactment.”508  His focus was not on constitutional the-
ory or the identification of constitutional rights but rather on a worka-
day inquiry that combined empirical assessment with qualitative judg-
ment: “[W]hether the means devised by the State are germane to an end 
which may be lawfully accomplished and have a real or substantial re-
lation to the protection of health, as involved in the daily work of the 
persons . . . engaged in bakery and confectionery establishments.”509 
The Brandeis Brief was yet a twinkle in Louis Brandeis’s eye, but 
there was Justice Harlan in Lochner basing his analysis in part on  
German doctor Ludwig Hirt’s 1871 treatise calling the work of bakers 
“among the hardest and most laborious imaginable” and quoting an-
other author’s conclusions that “[t]he constant inhaling of flour dust 
causes inflammation of the lungs and of the bronchial tubes,” the long 
hours bakers work “produce rheumatism, cramps and swollen legs,” and 
“[n]early all bakers are pale-faced and of more delicate health than the 
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workers of other crafts.”510  Justice Harlan’s dissent also cited statistics 
showing that the average daily working time was shorter than the 
Bakeshop Act’s ceiling in a number of Western countries and cited find-
ings in a New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor report that endorsed 
shorter work hours and noted that bakers in particular are exposed to 
“conditions that interfere with nutrition.”511  The attitude that this opin-
ion enabled is one of not just deference to the legislature but basic re-
spect for its work in seeking to address a social problem. 
When the Court abandoned Lochner and related cases in 1937, it 
implicitly adopted the Holmes rather than the Harlan critique.512  The 
most succinct statement of the new rights regime appears in Carolene 
Products and footnote four.  Justice Stone appended the footnote to his 
statement that “legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is 
not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts 
made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude 
the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the 
knowledge and experience of the legislators.”513  Footnote four then 
pitches three categorical exceptions to the rational basis standard:  
specifically enumerated constitutional rights, laws restricting the  
process of political change, and laws directed at “discrete and insular  
minorities.”514 
This statement and footnote are the prototype for the tiers-of- 
scrutiny framework515: a law is upheld against a rights attack if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest unless the right asserted 
falls into a protected category, delimited ex ante.  Importantly, the ra-
tional basis test may rely on hypothetical motivations,516 betraying its 
notional premise that what drives the constitutional inquiry is not the 
nature of the social problem the legislature seeks to address but rather, 
and predominantly, the decontextualized nature of the right infringed.  
The Court, like Justice Holmes, does not care about a statute’s substance 
except in those presumptively rare instances in which the legislature’s 
brazen violation of the Bill of Rights, political self-dealing, or racial or 
religious bigotry is, for some peculiar reason, justified.517 
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There is no reason to treat this categorical regime as specially tied to 
American history or enduring values.  The Lochner era was, after all, 
many decades long and it was in important ways continuous with prior 
periods.518  In the waning days of the Great Depression, as President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt began his second term and his third New Deal,519 
with the top federal income tax rate approaching eighty percent,520 and 
on the eve of the Second World War, the paradigmatic mischief to which 
the Fourteenth Amendment was directed seemed more obviously to be 
racial and religious discrimination and infringements on political 
speech, not economic regulation.  The Lochner-era regime was believed 
to be an obvious failure,521 and Carolene Products reflected reasonable 
views about the unfinished business of U.S. constitutional law.  That 
unfinished business would require the Court to confront the system-
wide pathologies that Jim Crow, religious bias, and red-baiting reflected.  
The contrast with the Lochner era, in which the Court self-consciously 
second-guessed particularized legislative judgments about economic 
policy, made it easy to essentialize pathology as what constitutional law 
was rightly about. 
More broadly, Carolene Products conspicuously, and artificially, seg-
regated the race question from questions of political economy.  Leaving 
the government free to pursue “social and economic” measures but not 
those that target racial minorities incompletely theorizes what social and 
economic regulation might entail.  Carolene Products itself suppressed 
the right of a business to enter a market,522 and the roughly contempo-
raneous decision in United States v. Darby523 suppressed a right to con-
tract that would have prevented wage and hour legislation.524  But the 
Carolene Products regime was on its own terms indifferent to whether 
the rights suppressed in the future were, for example, rights to welfare, 
to education, to unionization, or to collective bargaining, including con-
tractual rights that can preserve a union’s gains.525  And second- 
generation claims by racial and religious minorities are not easily distin-
guished, a priori, from claims to social or economic justice advanced by 
others.  And so in cases like Washington v. Davis, McCleskey v. Kemp, 
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and Employment Division v. Smith, it appeared to the Court that it 
could not give an inch without giving a mile. 
Consider Griswold, then, in this light.  By 1965, the Court had come 
to define its mandate in significant part through Brown and southern 
efforts to resist desegregation.  Even its most significant freedom of 
speech case of the decade, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,526 may be 
viewed as an effort to arm civil rights advocates to resist southern ju-
ries.527  But Griswold seemed not to involve any of the Carolene  
Products categories.  The right to use birth control was not specifically 
enumerated in the Constitution.  It did not in any obvious way implicate 
channels of political change.528  And the women burdened by laws reg-
ulating birth control were neither discrete and insular nor, as such, mem-
bers of a minority group.529  The options available to the Griswold Court 
were at least three,530 and they mirrored those available to the Lochner 
Court.  The Court could uphold the Connecticut law, as Justices Black 
and Stewart urged.531  It could carefully weigh the State’s moral (or 
whatever other) interest in banning contraceptives against basic free-
doms of marital privacy and reproductive autonomy — both simply ap-
plications of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause — and 
strike the law down.  Justice Harlan would have so held, conjuring his 
grandfather.532  Or, the Court could invalidate the law by creating a new 
category, privacy, in effect the forgotten fourth paragraph of Carolene 
Products. 
The first option — abdication — ran contrary to the political winds, 
the constitutional instincts of seven members of the Griswold Court, and 
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the personal views of all nine.533  As Justice Harlan emphasized in a 
related case, the Connecticut law was unusually obnoxious in outlawing 
the use of contraceptives as opposed to simply their distribution.534  
Contraceptives were used, in some cases, to prevent life- 
threatening pregnancies,535 and so the law seemed at least problem-
atic — and substantive due process therefore viable — as applied to 
those cases.536  The law was virtually unenforceable and was triggered 
in the case itself only because of Estelle Griswold’s calculated effort to 
have herself arrested.537  A 1962 Gallup poll found that seventy-two 
percent of respondents, and fifty-six percent of Roman Catholics, fa-
vored birth control information being openly available.538  The Griswold 
case was an effect, not a cause, of the sexual revolution; it was scarcely 
imaginable, still less in retrospect, that the Warren Court would have 
upheld the law. 
The second option, to conceive of the right at stake as simply an 
aspect of constitutionally protected liberty and balance it against the 
State’s interest, rushed headlong into Lochner.  Without creating an ad-
ditional and sharply delineated category, the Court could distinguish 
Lochner only on its facts.  But having the Court distinguish valid from 
invalid statutes solely on the facts was itself the discredited Lochner 
approach.  Viewing Lochner and Griswold through a proportionality 
lens could have illuminated a distinction that, familiar as the cases are, 
the received wisdom obscures.  The conventional narrative of Lochner 
is that no rights were at issue.  There is no right to contract, and so, 
following Justice Holmes, the legislature should be free to pursue its 
interests, themselves uninteresting to the Constitution or the Court.  But 
the Bakeshop Act might better be understood as creating a conflict of 
rights.  Bakers had not merely an interest in but a right to safe, healthy 
working conditions, a right protected through legislation rather than ju-
ridification.  Bakery owners and dissenting bakers also had rights to 
contract that entitled them to the attention of a constitutional court.  
The Court’s job was to sort out whether the statute was justified in light 
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of those contractual rights, a task to which the rights dimensions of the 
law should have been relevant but weren’t.539  It is far more difficult to 
conceive of the Connecticut birth control law as sounding in rights, and 
that should matter to a reviewing court. 
The influence of legal process thinking likely helped doom this kind 
of approach in Griswold.  Legal process emphasizes acoustic separation 
between the roles of judges and of legislatures.  As Ely once put it, legal 
process scholars share the “starting assumption that those who would 
justify judicial invalidation of legislation must do so on the basis of some 
characteristic that courts possess in greater measure than ordinary po-
litical officials.”540  Embedded within legal process theory is a view of 
the Court’s role that is continuous with the fundamentally private law 
vision of judicial review handed down from Chief Justice Marshall in 
Marbury.541  On this view, judges are on firmest ground when they are 
interpreting legal documents using modes of analysis that transparently 
limit their discretion.  Modern, stepwise proportionality analysis is not 
necessarily inconsistent with legal process and indeed shares its empha-
sis on case-by-case adjudication, but the open-ended balancing of  
Justice Harlan’s Poe v. Ullman542 dissent was less than edifying.543  In-
deed, as a law clerk to Chief Justice Warren the Term Griswold was 
decided, Ely told his boss that “Harlan’s opinion in Poe boils down to a 
statement that he does not like the Conn[ecticut] law.  This vague, ‘out-
rage’ approach to the 14th Amendment comprises, in my opinion, the 
most dangerous sort of ‘activism.’”544 
The third option available to the Griswold Court — to create a new 
category for heightened scrutiny around the fundamental right to pri-
vacy — ultimately commanded a Court.545  The difference between an 
approach that exalted the right to privacy as a distinct category and one 
that, like Justice Harlan’s Poe dissent, saw it as simply one aspect of 
liberty, was not merely rhetorical.  Those made anxious by the flowering 
of rights in the 1960s could find more comfort in a categorical  
approach that appeared to exclude downstream consequences consid-
ered troublesome. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 539 It would also have been relevant to a proportionality analysis whether the law was indeed 
motivated, as Professor David Bernstein has suggested, by a wish to harm the economic interests 
of immigrant bakers rather than a (non-exclusive) desire to protect the working conditions of bakers.  
See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER 26, 33 (2011). 
 540 John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where 
Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 834 n.4 (1991). 
 541 See Greene, supra note 265, at 48–49. 
 542 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
 543 See ELY, supra note 47, at 60–61. 
 544 GARROW, supra note 530, at 237 (alteration in original) (quoting Ely’s bench memo to Chief 
Justice Warren in Griswold). 
 545 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965); id. at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
  
106 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 132:28 
Consider, for example, Chief Justice Warren, who was uneasy with 
Griswold from the start of the case and indeed before, when it came to 
the Court in the guise of Poe.546  He confided in Ely after oral argument, 
and later told his colleagues at conference, that he could not “say the 
state has no legitimate interest” (as Justice White would argue in his 
separate concurrence547) because it would “lead me to trouble on abor-
tions.”548  He also could not “balance the interest of the state against 
that of the individual,” nor could he “use the substantive due process 
approach,” nor did he “believe the equal protection argument [was] 
sound,” nor did he “accept the privacy argument.”549  After initially join-
ing Justice White’s opinion550 — which he thought would be difficult to 
reconcile with abortion restrictions — he ultimately joined Justice  
Goldberg’s concurrence to give Justice Douglas a majority.551 
Griswold’s sprint away from Lochner’s methodology complicated the 
constitutional law that would follow.  Abortion is the most conspicuous 
area in which it might matter whether a right to privacy is itself funda-
mental or is instead an application of less well-defined liberty interests.  
To speak of abortion as a private matter begs the question, for many 
abortion rights opponents see it as filicide.  The law sometimes regards 
the killing of others as justified or excused, as for example in war, in 
self-defense, or in defense of others; U.S. law also generally grants lay-
persons a right to allow others to die even if we were uniquely situated 
to save their lives.552  We can therefore speak of one’s liberty to abort a 
fetus without violating the conditions of public reason.553  It is more 
difficult to hold such a conversation in the language of privacy, for one 
side simply rejects the premise.  As noted, the privacy rights frame led 
Justice Blackmun to the otherwise unnecessary provocation that fetuses 
were not constitutional persons. 
Abortion is the leading example but not the only one.  As social un-
derstandings of rights broadened in the 1960s and 1970s, the Court faced 
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 546 Chief Justice Warren began the conference by saying the Court could not invalidate the  
Connecticut law on its face because it would mean a return to the abandoned substantive due 
process of the Lochner era.  GARROW, supra note 530, at 181. 
 547 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505–06 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 548 GARROW, supra note 530, at 240. 
 549 Id. at 240–41. 
 550 See id. at 251–52. 
 551 Justice Goldberg’s opinion stated that it joined Justice Douglas’s opinion.  Griswold, 381 U.S. 
at 486–87 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 552 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04, 3.05 (AM. LAW INST. 1985); Marin Roger Scordato, Un-
derstanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
1447, 1452 (2008). 
 553 See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212–13, 217 (1993); see also John Finnis, Com-
mensuration and Public Reason, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRAC-
TICAL REASON 215 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997). 
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recurrences of the choices discussed above: rejection of the right out-
right, balancing, or trying to work within modular categories.  And ra-
ther than feel empowered to confront a world of heretofore audacious 
claims to gender equality, social welfare, equal public education, “re-
verse” racial discrimination, disparate impact, vote dilution, and inti-
mate freedom for sexual minorities with care and attention to context, 
the Court repeatedly has rested on ex ante categories. 
Thus, in Rodriguez, the Court considered not whether an important 
entitlement was being arbitrarily rationed but whether, as an interpre-
tive matter, “there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaran-
teed by the Constitution.”554  In Bowers v. Hardwick,555 upholding 
Georgia’s anti-sodomy law,556 and Washington v. Glucksberg,557 uphold-
ing the State’s ban on assisted suicide,558 the majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions fought incommensurably about the appropriate level 
of generality at which to assess a right’s connection to U.S. traditions 
rather than arguing commensurably about the State’s justifications for 
obvious limits on autonomy.559  Affirmative action opinions try to cram 
an obvious remedial measure aimed at a genuine social problem into the 
ill-fitting, stylized box of strict scrutiny.  The dissents cry bad faith,560 
and they have a point. 
Nor is the rights-as-trumps response simply the epiphenomenon for 
the ascendancy of conservative judicial politics.  Justice Black, the ne 
plus ultra of judicial absolutists, was politically liberal.  In Keyes v. 
School District No. 1,561 the Denver school desegregation case, it was 
the conservative Justice Powell who pushed for an approach more akin 
to proportionality while Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, fearing 
the pathology of separate but equal, embraced the formalistic distinction 
between de jure and de facto segregation.562  We can assume that, to the 
degree the courts are becoming more conservative, any methodology is 
going to be used to reach more conservative results on the margins.  It 
follows that any effort to resist that methodology will be accused of 
seeking more progressive outcomes — some readers no doubt will level 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 554 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1973) (emphasis added). 
 555 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 556 Id. at 189.  
 557 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 558 Id. at 705–06. 
 559 Compare Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192–93, and Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722–28 (defining the con-
tested right narrowly), with Bowers, 478 U.S. at 217–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting), and Glucksberg, 
521 U.S. at 773–82 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (defining the relevant right more  
expansively). 
 560 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2216 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 366 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 561 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
 562 See id. at 213–14; id. at 224–26 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); supra 
pp. 51–52. 
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the same charge at this Foreword.  But categorical adjudication is not 
inherently conservative, nor is proportionality inherently progressive.  
Either can be used to help or hurt the government, with whatever va-
lence doing so entails. 
And so it is not quite right to reject global approaches solely based 
on the politics of the U.S. judiciary.  But it is instructive to note that 
proportionality in its modern form did not develop until the 1960s and 
1970s.  Indeed, most constitutional courts did not develop their rights 
jurisprudence until that era or later.  The German Constitutional Court 
was established in 1951, and that Court’s initial foray into proportion-
ality dates to the 1958 Pharmacy Case.563  Throughout the 1970s the 
German Court, Swiss courts, and the European Court of Justice were 
the only courts with well-developed doctrinal proportionality frame-
works.564  The adoption of judicially recognized proportionality analysis 
in the European Court of Human Rights in the late 1970s and early 
1980s served as a catalyst for other Council of Europe jurisdictions.565  
Canada’s Supreme Court did not have constitutional jurisdiction in 
most rights cases until 1982,566 and Oakes came down in 1986.567  Israel 
had no enforceable “constitutional” rights until United Mizrahi Bank 
Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village568 was handed down in 1995.569  Most 
Latin American and African courts that engage in constitutional rights 
review have done so for not much longer.570  While the general idea of 
proportionality as justified government has roots in nineteenth-century 
German administrative law,571 proportionality doctrine as a technology 
of constitutional review is no older than the rights revolution itself. 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, constitutional courts in other coun-
tries were created with complex public law disputes at the forefront of 
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 563 7 BVERFGE 377 (Ger.); see also KOMMERS & MILLER, supra note 217, at 670. 
 564 See Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 236, at 103 n.79, 148. 
 565 Id. at 148. 
 566 The Constitution Act of 1982 declares the Canadian Constitution to be the supreme law.  Part 
VII of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).  The 
Charter is part of the Constitution Act.  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the 
Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 § 2 (U.K.). 
 567 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). 
 568 CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221 (1995) 
(Isr.). 
 569 Id.  Israel does not have a written constitution, but the United Mizrahi Bank case enabled 
judicial review of ordinary statutes for conformity with certain of the country’s Basic Laws.  See 
id. at 5. 
 570 See Joseph M. Isanga, African Judicial Review, the Use of Comparative African Jurispru-
dence, and the Judicialization of Politics, 49 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 749, 751 (2017); Rodrigo 
Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law in Latin America: Trends and Chal-
lenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1601 (2011). 
 571 COHEN-ELIYA & PORAT, supra note 28, at 24–32; Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra note 236, 
at 97. 
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their jurisdiction,572 with relative transparency about the range of 
claims sounding in rights that litigants might advance.573  The U.S.  
Supreme Court had a nearly 200-year-old well of inertia, with the bag-
gage of the Lochner era slowing its march toward modern adjudication.  
The Second World War, moreover, had been predicated on a genuine 
crisis in rights recognition.  European constitutional and human rights 
courts built from the ashes of that conflict were likely better primed to 
match their rights jurisprudence to the lived experience of litigants.  Pro-
portionality’s promise is that few claims are wholly beneath  
constitutional concern, a message that the German Court and others 
have explicitly, indeed solemnly, endorsed.574  Americans took a very 
different lesson from the war, one that reinforced beliefs about the ex-
ceptional strength of American institutions.575  All of which is not to say 
that the categorical approach is determined but rather that change will 
require a shift, so to speak, in attitude. 
B.  Rights at the Founding 
Rights as trumps is not an American birthright.  It is fair to say that 
the U.S. political culture tends to be more classically liberal-minded than 
many of its counterparts around the world.  But that orientation bears 
less responsibility for the rights-as-trumps ideology than we might sup-
pose.  At a minimum, it is difficult to locate the ideology in the U.S. 
Founding-era history.  There is plenty of evidence that citizens of the 
Founding generation would see modern Canada as more closely approx-
imating their vision of rights recognition and enforcement than the 
United States.  That proposition is at best an incomplete argument 
against rights as trumps on the merits, but it tends to refute the view 
that the ideology of rights absolutism is an inheritance from Madison or 
is otherwise baked into the Constitution. 
Originalists have stressed the many ways in which the Warren and 
Burger Courts departed from Founding-era expectations about the sub-
stance of constitutional rights.576  They have been less vocal about the 
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 572 See STONE SWEET, supra note 459, at 37–38. 
 573 Id. at 40–41, 42–43. 
 574 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 1975, 39 
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 1, http://www.servat. 
unibe.ch/dfr/bv039001.html [https://perma.cc/FZV5-8PH5] (Ger.), translated in Robert E. Jonas & 
John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. 
PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1976). 
 575 See Jed Rubenfeld, Commentary, Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1971, 1985–86 (2004). 
 576 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 338–39 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA 69–74, 101, 169–70 (1990). 
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ways in which those Courts also departed from Founding-era expecta-
tions about how rights disputes would be resolved.  There is now a  
decades-long debate over the degree to which the lawyers of that age 
were themselves originalist or would have expected constitutional inter-
pretation to be originalist as well.577  This focus reflects the U.S. fixation 
on rights adjudication as an interpretive exercise.  The literature is by 
comparison razor thin on the crucial questions of what Founding-era 
lawyers would have thought infringement of a right entailed and how it 
should be remedied.  And yet the symbiosis between rights absolutism 
and rights definition that section III.E.3 observed in Justice Black’s po-
sition runs in both directions: what the Founders thought citizens had a 
right to do is intelligible only if we know what they thought followed 
from that right. 
Two crucial differences between rights understandings of that era 
and our own confound this historical inquiry.  First, modern Americans 
associate rights reflexively with adjudication, whereas citizens of the 
Founding generation associated them with political representation.  Sec-
ond, and relatedly, the rights recognized in the modern Constitution typ-
ically apply against all levels of government, whereas the Bill of Rights 
was primarily a federalism measure designed to protect state representa-
tive institutions — juries most prominently — from federal encroach-
ment.  No constructive discussion of rights at the Founding can ignore 
either of those factors. 
1.  Rights as Representation. — The American colonists were British 
subjects who inherited British understandings of rights.  The central 
feature of British constitutionalism was parliamentary sovereignty, what 
Professor Jack Rakove calls “the single most profound consequence of 
the Glorious Revolution.”578  Within the British tradition, rights were 
secured through representation in the legislature and on juries, not 
through judicial review of legislation, which would have put subjects’ 
rights in the hands of the King’s judges.579  The 1689 Declaration of 
Rights was accordingly directed at the Crown, on behalf of rather than 
in opposition to the legislature.580 
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 577 Compare H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 915–23 (1985) (arguing that the framers did not believe “original intent,” as the term is 
currently used, was an appropriate interpretive tool), with John O. McGinnis & Michael B.  
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 758–80 (2009) (arguing that the Constitution should be in-
terpreted using the interpretive tools used by the Founders). 
 578 JACK N. RAKOVE, DECLARING RIGHTS 33 (1998). 
 579 Id. 
 580 An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of the 
Crown (Bill of Rights) 1689, 1 W. & M. (Eng.), reprinted in RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 41, 41–45; 
see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 272 
(1969). 
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The colonists broke from that tradition, of course, but not cleanly.  
The Declaration of Independence famously announces the “self-evident” 
truths of the “unalienable” rights to “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness,” but it crucially adds “[t]hat to secure these rights, Govern-
ments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed.”581  Eight of the eleven states that drafted new 
constitutions in the early years of independence included declarations or 
bills of rights.582  But like in the Declaration of Independence, the liber-
ties asserted were inseparable from the representative institutions meant 
to enforce them.  As Gordon Wood writes of the state constitutions, “the 
American legislatures in the seventies and eighties . . . acted as the prin-
cipal interpreters of the fundamental laws they sat under.”583 
As foxes guarding henhouses will, state legislatures frequently suc-
cumbed to the temptation to act with functional impunity, and their 
susceptibility to overreaching and factional capture was a significant 
motivation behind the Philadelphia Convention.584  The U.S. constitu-
tional response to legislative abuses of power was not, however, judicial 
review, but rather checks and balances.585  “Judges were historically re-
garded not as independent arbiters of justice but as agents (even lackeys) 
of the executive branch,” Rakove writes.  To imagine a special judicial 
role in enforcing a bill of rights “thus anticipated the new enlarged role 
that this third branch of government would now come to play.  It was 
in fact a prediction of the course that American constitutionalism would 
take, not a description of its initial status.”586 
The historical relationship between legislatures and bills of rights 
puts into perspective James Madison’s well-known description of bills 
of rights as “parchment barriers.”587  Madison did not believe that a bill 
of rights had much to say to “interested majorities,” who would always 
act to promote those interests.588  Indeed, although he believed that 
judges would play a role in enforcing the Bill of Rights against the fed-
eral government,589 part of Madison’s defense of the view that a national 
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 581 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); see also Jud Campbell, Re-
publicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 97–98 (2017) (book 
review) (explaining that a representative government could still pass laws implicating “unalienable” 
rights per a theory of social contract). 
 582 RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 36. 
 583 WOOD, supra note 580, at 274. 
 584 See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE 
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 353–57 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975). 
 585 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 586 RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 164. 
 587 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 295, 297–300 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975). 
 588 Id. 
 589 James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 196, 206–07 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (“If they are incorporated into 
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Bill of Rights might be enforceable in a way that state declarations were 
not was that state legislatures, as “sure guardians of the people’s liberty,” 
would hold the national government’s feet to the fire.590 
In coming around to the utility of the Bill of Rights, Madison put 
forward two central rationales.  First, articulating the aspirational val-
ues of the people helps them to internalize those values over time.591  
Second, when in unusual cases the government oppression emerges  
independent of the majority will, “a bill of rights will be a good ground 
for an appeal to the sense of the community.”592  For Madison, what 
separated a popular government from a monarchy was that in the for-
mer, “the political and physical power . . . [are] vested in the same hands, 
that is in a majority of the people.”593  The structural checks Madison 
envisioned would make it difficult for oppressive majorities to control 
too many levers of government, but he viewed the Bill of Rights as — 
if anything — congenial to rather than an obstacle to the majority  
community. 
It is crucial, of course, to distinguish the majority as represented in 
legislatures from the administration.  As noted, the sense that rights 
were good as against the King was a crucial inheritance of the Glorious 
Revolution.  But the mode of representation that would best resist the 
Executive was less the legislature than the jury, which the Founding 
generation saw as an essential vehicle for articulating the rights of the 
community.594  “In these two powers consist wholly, the liberty and se-
curity of the people,” John Adams wrote of voting for the legislature and 
of trial by jury.  “They have no other fortification against wanton, cruel 
power: no other indemnification against being ridden like horses, fleeced 
like sheep, worked like cattle, and fed and cloathed like swine and 
hounds: No other defence against fines, imprisonments, whipping posts, 
gibbets, bastenadoes and racks.”595 
Adams was writing in 1766, against the Stamp Act, but the view of 
juries as bound up crucially with rights recognition and enforcement 
motivated the Bill of Rights.596  In criticizing the 1787 Constitution, the 
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the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians of those rights . . . .”). 
 590 Id. at 207. 
 591 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 587, at 297. 
 592 Id. 
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 594 See JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION: THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 48–52 (1986); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due 
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27, 1766, reprinted in RAKOVE, supra note 578, at 55, 60. 
 596 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 83–84 (1998). 
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influential antifederalist Federal Farmer called the jury trial and legis-
lative representation “the wisest and most fit means of protecting [the 
people] in the community.”597  Jurors were drawn from that very  
community and had vast powers of investigation, via the grand jury, 
and adjudication, via the petit jury.598  As Professor Akhil Reed Amar 
emphasizes, jury service was commonly viewed as analogous to service 
in the legislature itself.599 
2.  Rights as Federalism. — Viewing the Bill of Rights through an 
eighteenth-century lens illuminates its focus on institutional form.   
A remarkable number of its amendments seek to preserve the role  
of the jury and other local representative institutions in federal  
administration.600 
There is the obvious language of the Fifth Amendment grand jury 
requirement,601 the Sixth Amendment criminal jury trial guarantee and 
its accompanying vicinage command,602 and the Seventh Amendment 
right to a civil jury and preservation of that jury’s factfinding.603  But 
consider as well that the First Amendment was initially understood pri-
marily as a restriction on prior restraints.604  Prior restraints were more 
problematic than speech infringements enforced through ex post liability 
because licensing fell within the purview of executive rather than judi-
cial processes, and so the jury was cut out of determining the underlying 
validity of the regulation.605  The Second Amendment protected mili-
tias — another form of local rights enforcement606 — from disarmament 
at the hands of the federal government.607  The Fourth Amendment’s 
reference to “unreasonable” searches and seizures put a classic jury ques-
tion at the heart of its protections and erected an obstacle — a warrant 
requirement and the probable cause standard — to searches justified ex 
ante before judges.608  The Fifth Amendment protected the petit jury’s 
judgment via the Double Jeopardy Clause.609  The Eighth Amendment 
aimed to restrict federal judges who might depart from community sen-
tencing standards.610 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 597 Letters from the Federal Farmer, Letter IV (Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 245, 250 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
 598 AMAR, supra note 596, at 85. 
 599 See id. at 94–96. 
 600 See id. at 96. 
 601 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 602 See id. amend. VI. 
 603 See id. amend. VII. 
 604 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 168–70 (1985). 
 605 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 23–24. 
 606 See id. at 46–59. 
 607 See U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 608 See Amar, supra note 38, at 759; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 609 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 96; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Amar makes the important observation that the origin of the Bill of 
Rights in federalism — in the rights of local communities against exter-
nal or minority usurpation — complicates the incorporation story.611  
Collective rights to local self-governance do not seamlessly translate  
into individual interests in avoiding oppression from that same self- 
governance.  Confusion over the best way to understand the Second 
Amendment is most emblematic of this complication, but it applies more 
broadly.612  Amar’s solution is to choose whether and how to incorporate 
based on which elements of a right were best understood in the 1860s  
in private rather than federalism-related terms.613  Whether or not one 
accepts Amar’s “refined incorporation,”614 the relevant point for our 
purposes is his recognition that this inquiry must be contextual.615 
The federalism core of the Bill of Rights might affect not only the 
degree to which one believes a right incorporated but also how to adju-
dicate the right when it arises.  It made some sense to say, with Madison, 
that “absolute restrictions [on rights] in cases that are doubtful . . . ought 
to be avoided” when, as Madison maintained, any such restrictions could 
not overcome “the decided sense of the public” in whose name they 
speak.616  It might make less sense when, as Dworkin argued, the over-
riding purpose of identifying a right is to prevent that “decided sense” 
from interfering with it.  This Foreword has accordingly emphasized 
that how a constitutional community adjudicates rights should follow 
not from any mysticism about the particular rights at stake or about 
rights in general but rather from the paradigmatic forms of mischief the 
community wishes to confront.  A well-intentioned but shortsighted ma-
jority, a minority that has captured policy levers, a local majority outly-
ing from a hierarchically superior majority, and a tyrannical national 
majority acting in bad faith all require different forms of intervention 
when they infringe rights. 
Madison’s reference to “doubtful” cases gestures further at the im-
portant distinction between core violations of a right and more marginal 
ones.  U.S. courts sometimes draw this distinction and sometimes do 
not,617 with little or no attention paid to the criteria that should motivate 
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 611 See AMAR, supra note 596, at 215–16; see also Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment 
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 612 See AMAR, supra note 596, 216–18. 
 613 See id. at 221. 
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it or that have motivated it in the past.  Proportionality analysis neces-
sarily differentiates between big and small rights violations, a sensitivity 
that seems precisely appropriate to the Due Process Clause, the doctrinal 
avenue U.S. courts use to apply the Bill of Rights and other substantive 
rights against state governments.  The word “due” invites a  
decisionmaker to calibrate the degree of judicial intervention to the egre-
giousness, all things considered, of the government’s interference with 
liberty.618 
These pages are not the place for a comprehensive history of rights 
enforcement in the United States.  Before leaving this topic, however, it 
is well to point out the affinities between Founding-era rights under-
standings and those characteristic of the proto-proportionality of the 
Lochner era.  For both Madison and Justice Peckham, the great threat 
to liberty was not intentional oppression of discrete and insular minori-
ties but rather factionalism: interested majorities acting for the benefit 
of a motivated and resourced minority rather than for the greater 
good.619  Nineteenth-century state court decisions repeatedly interpreted 
their own state constitutions to prohibit factional legislation,620 not be-
cause the particular rights at issue were sacrosanct or absolute but be-
cause interference with liberty should be for good reasons.  For state 
laws, both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment, the primary 
issue for U.S. courts was not authority but justification. 
C.  On Facts and Remedies 
This Part has emphasized the contingencies that have led the U.S. 
culture of rights adjudication to adopt a rights-as-trumps ideology  
rather than proportionality.  The many ways in which elements of pro-
portionality creep into U.S. law, often sub rosa, suggest that shifting to 
proportionality across the board would be less disruptive than it might 
seem.  Still, two stubborn tendencies of U.S. courts bear mention as lin-
gering obstacles that frustrate proportionality analysis and the reasoning 
behind it.  First, U.S. courts do not have reliable mechanisms for adju-
dicating empirical disputes over the facts on which effective proportion-
ality analysis depends.  Second, U.S. courts tend to disfavor the kind of 
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 618 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. 
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Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260 (1829).  
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remedial discretion that goes hand in hand with treating cases contex-
tually.  This section discusses each in brief, incorporating by reference 
more elaborate comments I have offered elsewhere.621 
1.  Facts. — U.S. courts possess few resources independent of the 
parties to gather and evaluate facts.622  The kinds of facts relevant to 
constitutional disputes on a proportionality model are those going to the 
government’s motivation for a law or practice, the state of the world to 
which the government purports to be responding, the availability of al-
ternative means of achieving its ends that are less costly in rights terms, 
the law’s policy benefits, and the marginal burden on the rights claimant 
and those similarly situated.  These are what Professor Kenneth  
Culp Davis identified as “legislative” facts,623 those facts that “help the 
tribunal to determine the content of law and policy and to exercise its 
judgment or discretion in determining what course of action to take.”624  
Legislative facts are to be distinguished from adjudicative facts, those 
“concerning the immediate parties — who did what, where, when, how, 
and with what motive or intent” — that are typically adduced via doc-
umentary evidence and witness testimony.625 
When a constitutional decision turns on legislative facts, as propor-
tionality urges, those facts become “constitutional facts.”626  Because 
they determine the law’s content and not just its application, constitu-
tional facts are appropriately subject to de novo rather than deferential 
review by appellate courts.627  The problems with de novo appellate 
review of facts in the U.S. system are many, and they become worse at 
the Supreme Court.  The Court relies on party presentation at the trial 
court level to develop the record on appeal.  When it wishes to supple-
ment the record — as it does routinely — the Court relies on biased 
amici whose claims have not typically been subject to adversarial test-
ing,628 or else it conducts its own research, say at the Mayo Clinic629 or 
on the World Wide Web.630  A case ripe for certiorari often has multiple 
district court records, developed by parties of varying degrees of sophis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 621 See generally Greene, supra note 265. 
 622 See Frederick Schauer, Our Informationally Disabled Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, 
at 105, 111.  
 623 Legislative facts are sometimes called “social facts.”  Borgmann, supra note 265, at 1187. 
 624 Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 952 (1955). 
 625 Id. 
 626 See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 230–31 (1985). 
 627 Id. at 238–39. 
 628 Allison Orr Larsen, The Trouble with Amicus Facts, 100 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1800–02 (2014). 
 629 See LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN 82–83 (2005). 
 630 See William R. Wilkerson, The Emergence of Internet Citations in U.S. Supreme Court Opin-
ions, 27 JUST. SYS. J. 323, 325 (2006). 
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tication.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure impose significant con-
straints on third-party intervention,631 and the Court itself imposes strict 
limits on third-party standing that might permit more knowledgeable 
organizations or individuals to help prosecute or defend a case.632  By 
contrast, courts born of civil law traditions often rely on an inquisitorial 
model that can enable a constitutional court to supplement the record 
through independent inquiry.633 
It may be that this objection proves too much.  The Court’s wanting 
approach to legislative facts, though understudied, is pervasive.634   
It lingers as a limitation whether the Court adopts proportionality 
wholesale or, as now, adopts ad hoc variants or avoids it altogether.  To 
the degree the Court is unbothered by its current approach to legislative 
facts, it might be equally unbothered under proportionality, even if a 
few pedants in the academy insist it should be more attentive.  That 
said, taking this challenge seriously would prompt a reconsideration of 
rules of intervention and standing, perhaps a loosening of oral argument 
procedures to permit parties or amici to present and respond to evidence, 
the increased use of special masters,635 or perhaps even the creation and 
use of a judicial research service akin to the one that assists Congress in 
developing its own factual record.636 
2.  Remedies. — In the 2016 case of Zubik v. Burwell,637 a group of 
primarily nonprofit organizations sued for religious exemptions from 
federal requirements, implementing the Affordable Care Act, that they 
provide their employees with health insurance plans that covered cer-
tain contraceptives.638  The nonprofits argued that, even though they 
could exempt themselves from the requirement by noting their religious 
objections on a form submitted to their insurer or to the government, 
signing the form would result in their employees receiving coverage and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 631 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24 (generally limiting intervention to those holding a claim that shares “a 
common question of law or fact”). 
 632 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 127 (2004) (holding that a group of attorneys suing 
on behalf of indigent potential clients lacked standing); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44, 46 (1943) 
(per curiam) (holding that a physician did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a 
state statute that did not affect his Fourteenth Amendment rights, but rather his patients’).  
 633 See Hughes & MacDonnell, supra note 265, at 40–41 (describing how the German Constitu-
tional Court may use its investigatory powers). 
 634 See Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 
DUKE L.J. 1, 43–50 (2011); Borgmann, supra note 265, at 1186–89.   
 635 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 53 (outlining the existing rules regarding the appointment and 
authority of masters). 
 636 See Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed 
Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (1986); Gorod, supra note 634, 
at 73. 
 637 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam). 
 638 Id. at 1559. 
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was therefore a religious burden sufficient to trigger the protections of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.639 
Rather than award victory to either side in the conflict, the Court 
instead acted as a mediator.  It requested supplemental briefing on 
whether the government could accommodate the organizations.640  Sat-
isfied that the briefing clarified the parties’ amenability to such a solu-
tion, the Court remanded to the lower courts to give the parties a chance 
“to arrive at an approach going forward that accommodates petitioners’ 
religious exercise while at the same time ensuring that women covered 
by petitioners’ health plans ‘receive full and equal health coverage, in-
cluding contraceptive coverage.’”641  This unusual disposition owes al-
most certainly to Justice Scalia’s death a few weeks before oral argu-
ment.  Rather than split 4–4, which seemed reasonably likely at the time, 
the Court punted instead. 
Bracketing whether this disposition was appropriate in Zubik itself, 
the Court could do with more dispositions that offer the parties an op-
portunity to respond to the Court’s direction or concerns.  Thus, the 
Court could make use of what is sometimes called a “suspension of in-
validity,” a common disposition around the world that gives a period of 
time for the government to apply its own fix to a constitutional infirmity 
before judicial invalidation of an act.642  The Court itself deployed a 
remedy of this sort in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co.643  After holding that the scope of jurisdiction Congress 
had granted to bankruptcy courts violated Article III,644 the Court sus-
pended its judgment for several months to give Congress a chance to 
reconstitute the bankruptcy courts without disrupting ongoing proceed-
ings.645  There, a suspension of invalidity was deemed appropriate be-
cause of fear of administrative disorder, but there is good reason for 
courts also to suspend invalidity out of deference to the ordinary priority 
of political decisionmaking and respect for a complex regulatory scheme 
that may be unconstitutional but not invidious.646  A remedy of that sort 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 639 Id.; see also Geneva Coll. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 778 F.3d 422, 427 
(3d Cir. 2015). 
 640 Zubik, 136 S. Ct. at 1559–60. 
 641 Id. at 1560 (quoting Supplemental Brief for the Respondents at 1, Zubik, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (No. 
14-1418)). 
 642 See Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 
DUKE L.J. 1, 43–58 (2016) (discussing the Constitutional Court of South Africa’s and Supreme 
Court of Canada’s discretion to suspend a declaration of invalidity in order to allow executive or 
legislative intervention). 
 643 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
 644 Id. at 87 (plurality opinion). 
 645 Id. at 88. 
 646 The Court in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), cast doubt on 
the constitutionality of purely prospective civil remedies in constitutional cases.  Id. at 94–99.  The 
Court potentially could implement suspensions of invalidity by withholding its mandate as needed. 
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might have been apt, for example, in Shelby County v. Holder,647 when 
the Court gutted the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act 
without giving Congress a chance to respond to its opinion with the Act 
still in place by, for example, creating a new preclearance formula prior 
to the abolition of the old one.648  Or in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, rather than striking down  
Seattle’s voluntary school integration plan, the Court could have re-
quested a letter brief proposing a solution to the only constitutional 
problem the controlling opinion identified: a too-blunt taxonomy of ra-
cial groups.649 
The respect for the legislature’s work and the epistemic modesty im-
plicit in a suspension of invalidity fits proportionality’s governing as-
sumption that, in the usual case, a constitutional rights problem results 
from reasonable disagreement about the scope of rights rather than from 
bad faith or from willful denial of equal citizenship.  The legislature has 
not just an interest in but a right to address social problems in the first 
instance, a right that it should not relinquish simply because five  
judges think it got things wrong.  On the flip side, proportionality in the 
absence of remedial flexibility tends to replicate, and even exacerbate, 
one of the pathologies of rights absolutism.  When rights are trumps, 
constitutional validity can turn on a contested interpretive judgment 
that flattens a rich set of empirical questions and normative judgments 
into a dull heuristic.  Proportionality analysis is more sensitive to the 
complexity of the merits, but ending the analysis with a binary remedy 
can place more weight on the Court’s answer to the question than is 
appropriate to the sensitivity of the inquiry.  Facts can change, even the 
constitutional sort, and lawmaking can be difficult.  Courts should not 
in the usual case invalidate a law while legislative remedial options re-
main on the table. 
V.  FORWARD 
It is time at last for brass tacks.  Where do we go from here? The 
previous Part sought to emphasize that we need not go as far as the 
shock of a case like the Pigeon-Feeding Case might suggest.650  Lower 
court judges are bound by the Supreme Court’s doctrinal frames, but 
the Court itself is not.  Individual Justices have rejected the rights-as-
trumps ideology,651 and the Court already abandons its rule-like doc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 647 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 648 Id. at 556–57. 
 649 551 U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 650 See supra pp. 56–58. 
 651 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 730–31 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
judgment); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“There is only one 
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trines selectively, including in Carpenter v. United States, discussed be-
low.652  The Court could justify a transition to proportionality as a 
means of providing needed coherence to what already occurs in dis-
jointed, ad hoc, and unreflective ways. 
Rejecting a rights-as-trumps ideology can affect real cases, three in-
stances of which are highlighted below.  In the first, Masterpiece 
Cakeshop, proportionality analysis might well have changed the case’s 
framing, and the case would have been a meet candidate for the reme-
dial flexibility just discussed.  The second case, Carpenter, shows how 
categorical adjudication has bogged down Fourth Amendment doctrine 
and led courts consistently to ask the wrong set of questions — about 
what constitutes a search, instead of about what makes a search unrea-
sonable.  Finally, the Court’s partisan gerrymandering cases illuminate 
the distortion rights as trumps produces: confronted with an actual pa-
thology, the Court has retreated to a discourse of manageability that is 
better suited to its standard constitutional docket. 
A.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission 
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a misguided case from soup to cake.  First, 
the soup: the case was a flawed candidate for certiorari as it was framed.  
Reconciling antidiscrimination law with religious freedom raises im-
portant constitutional and legal questions, but this case was a poor ve-
hicle for addressing those questions.  As noted, the parties agreed that, 
as a general matter, an artistic baker has a First Amendment free speech 
right to choose the messages he squirts onto his cakes and also that a 
baker in Colorado cannot refuse or modify service to people based on 
their sexual orientation.653  They disagreed about whether the baker’s 
refusal to bake a cake for the couple’s wedding (but willingness to pro-
vide other services) constituted protected freedom of speech or unpro-
tected sexual orientation discrimination.654  The record in the case 
showed no epidemic of same-sex couples being refused artisanal cakes 
from bakers willing to provide an off-the-rack alternative.655  The dig-
nitary injury to the couple and the psychological trauma of the baker 
were, by hypothesis, genuine and important, but the case offered, at 
best, error correction that the Colorado Court of Appeals could have 
handled just fine. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every State to govern impartially.  It does not direct the courts 
to apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other cases.”); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–103 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 652 See infra section V.B, pp. 124–27. 
 653 See supra p. 31. 
 654 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 4, 79. 
 655 The Court itself noted the insufficiency of the record, observing that the parties “disagree as 
to the extent of the baker’s refusal to provide service.”  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil 
Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). 
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Of course, there was a reason Phillips grounded his right of refusal 
primarily in freedom of speech rather than freedom of religion, and it 
speaks to the merits.  Phillips refused to bake the cake for Craig and 
Mullins not because he was an artist but because he was a Christian.656  
A freedom of religion frame would have set the issues in the terms in 
which the litigants actually experienced them, but would have run into 
a doctrinal hurdle.  Under Employment Division v. Smith, a religious 
objector has no First Amendment claim against a neutral law of general 
applicability, such as the Colorado public accommodations law.657  As 
section II.A.1 notes, Justice Scalia’s reason for so holding was precisely 
the fear of a slippery slope to “anarchy” that this Foreword has criticized 
courts for invoking.658  Prior to Smith, the Court was sensitive to the 
notion that religious objections to laws that did not target religion could 
not always win out, even if they had to be taken seriously.659  After 
Smith, religious objectors instead frame their arguments in the compar-
atively absolutist discourse of free speech and various federal and state 
religious freedom restoration acts.660  Smith does much mischief and 
should be overruled. 
Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s narrow opinion for the Court in  
Masterpiece Cakeshop was born of the analytic distortion Smith pro-
duces.  The conflict here called, above all, for sensitivity.  As Justice 
Kennedy emphasized, Phillips’s religious objection to what he viewed, 
reasonably, as participation in a same-sex wedding was sincere and 
deeply held.661  The State of Colorado’s commitment to nondiscrimina-
tion in public accommodations was equally sincere, deeply held, and 
legally significant.662  But a free speech decision could not accommodate 
the sensitivity the case demanded.  Either Phillips had no free speech 
claim — and therefore no claim at all, given Smith — or he had to win.  
And if Phillips had to win, then — given the doctrine’s insensitivity to 
content — so too did your average bigot.  Whoever was destined to win 
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the majority wanted to make both parties’ 
constitutional claims visible in a way that a free speech opinion lacked 
the resources to accomplish. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 656 Id. at 1724. 
 657 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601(2) (2017). 
 658 See supra section II.A.1, pp. 43–47. 
 659 See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 447–53 (1988);  
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–09 (1961) (plurality opinion). 
 660 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2760–61 (2014); State v.  
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 562–66 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded for reconsidera-
tion in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (mem.); Christopher C. Lund, RFRA, 
State RFRAs, and Religious Minorities, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 163, 165–71 (2016). 
 661 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1728. 
 662 Id. at 1724–25 (reciting Colorado’s history of antidiscrimination laws). 
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The Court found itself an exit ramp.  Seizing on evidence that some 
commissioners held Phillips’s religious views against him, the Court held 
that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s decision to hold him liable 
was not neutral after all.663  By deflecting the legal error away from 
either the Colorado legislature or Phillips and toward the stray com-
ments of commissioners, Justice Kennedy was able to write an opinion 
that deftly kept aloft both religious freedom and gay rights.  The dodge 
worked in this case, but it won’t work for long.  At the time it decided 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court had before it the cert petition in  
Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington,664 an analogous case in which a 
florist is defending her refusal to produce a bouquet for a same-sex wed-
ding in both speech and religion terms.665  The Court must confront 
Smith or face the same dilemma it deflected in Masterpiece Cakeshop. 
Proportionality would better enable a court to recognize that  
Masterpiece Cakeshop did not involve simply a right pressed against a 
government interest, but in fact involved a conflict of rights.  The  
Colorado public accommodations law deserves the double respect of be-
ing a duly passed state law and also being one that means to honor the 
state’s constitutional obligation to respect the rights of its gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual citizens.  A rights claimant should bear a heavy burden of 
persuasion in seeking to invalidate a law passed, in good faith, under 
those circumstances.666  A binary, rights-as-trumps frame obscures the 
state’s interest in Craig’s and Mullins’s rights.667 
Courts facing similar issues under the European Convention on  
Human Rights have felt liberated to recognize the multidimensional na-
ture of the rights at issue.  Most recently, in a series of cases on appeal 
to the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom as Lee v. McArthur,668 
courts in Northern Ireland had to determine whether the Convention’s 
protections for freedom of expression and religion gave Christian bakers 
the right to refuse to bake a non-wedding cake that had a message of 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 663 Id. at 1729–31. 
 664 State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 2671. 
 665 Id. at 549–51.  The Court vacated the state court decision in Arlene’s Flowers for reconsider-
ation in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop.  Arlene’s Flowers, 138 S. Ct. 2671. 
 666 It follows that the presence of a state RFRA would also be a relevant fact in addressing a 
religious freedom claim brought by a claimant or defendant who discriminates on the basis of reli-
gion, though due attention would need to be paid in those circumstances to the demands of the 
Establishment Clause.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J.,  
concurring). 
 667 In holding that the Commission had violated Phillips’s religious freedom, the Court relied on 
instances in which the Commission had found no liability for bakers who, for secular reasons, had 
refused to write antigay messages on cakes.  Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730.  While the 
state should not take religious objections to a customer’s request less seriously than secular ones — 
if anything, it should do the opposite — the presence of a state statute protecting against antigay 
discrimination makes the cases importantly different. 
 668 [2016] NICA 39 (appeal taken from N. Ir.). 
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support for same-sex marriage.669  Both the County Court and the Court 
of Appeal held for the customer, but both courts acknowledged and en-
gaged with the claims on both sides.670  The bakers’ freedom of religion 
was indeed implicated, those courts held, but because the relevant  
accommodations regulations had been passed to implement a competing 
obligation to protect against sexual orientation discrimination,  
courts owed deference to the legislature in conducting proportionality  
analysis.671 
In an earlier case, Ladele v. London Borough of Islington,672 Lillian 
Ladele, an employee of the local registrar of births, deaths, and mar-
riages, refused to certify civil partnerships, newly available under a 2004 
statute, on the basis of her Christian religious beliefs.673  Following a 
disciplinary hearing regarding her refusal, the Registrar General gave 
Ladele the option of signing paperwork for, but not conducting, such 
ceremonies, but she refused.674  Ladele eventually resigned and brought 
suit claiming religious discrimination in violation of the Convention.675  
The case reached the European Court of Human Rights, which held 
against her but not before accepting its obligation to “consider whether 
the [Registrar’s] policy pursued a legitimate aim and was proportion-
ate.”676  The Registrar’s “indirect” religious discrimination against 
Ladele, which would not be cognizable in the United States under 
Smith, was not dispositive of her claim — indeed, she lost — but the 
Strasbourg Court was sensitive to it. 
Ladele foregrounds an issue that should have been but was not a 
subject of discussion in Masterpiece Cakeshop: the remedy.  The sloppy 
hypotheticals the categorical frame encouraged the Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Court to entertain obscured the path to a less coercive, less 
binary resolution of the conflict.  The substantial agreement between 
the parties about the nature of each other’s rights naturally suggested a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 669 Id. [5]–[6]; see also Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental  
Freedoms arts. 9–10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230.  The case is currently pending before the 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.  Mark Simpson, “Gay Cake”: Ashers Bakery Case Heard 
at Supreme Court, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-
43955734 [https://perma.cc/RY9T-6CTS]. 
 670 Lee v. McArthur [2016] NICA 39, [61]–[67], [105]; Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. [2015] NICty 2, 
[77]–[99].  
 671 Lee v. McArthur [2016] NICA 39, [70]; Lee v. Ashers Baking Co. [2015] NICty 2, [88]–[91].  I 
bracket whether the courts were correct in construing the bakers’ refusal in this case as constituting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and therefore triggering that section of the appli-
cable antidiscrimination regulations. 
 672 [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357 (Eng.), aff’d sub nom. Eweida v. United Kingdom, 2013-I Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 215. 
 673 Eweida, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 229–32 (describing Ladele’s case).  Eweida combined Ladele’s 
case with three others at the European Court of Human Rights.  Id. at 223. 
 674 Id. at 231. 
 675 Id.; Ladele, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 1357, [5]. 
 676 Eweida, 2013-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 260. 
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mediated outcome, which neither the litigants nor the Court seemed to 
consider.  If the problem really was that a baker in Colorado has an 
obligation to serve customers without regard to their sexual orientation, 
but that for religious reasons Phillips could not personally bake the cou-
ple’s cake, then the Court could have (perhaps after mediation) required 
Phillips to provide a customized cake to the couple that he was not per-
sonally obligated to bake.677 
B.  Carpenter v. United States 
The Carpenter case is the latest in a string of Fourth Amendment 
conflicts implicated by the panoptic technologies of the digital age.678  
Timothy Carpenter was a suspect in a series of armed robberies.679  At 
trial, the government introduced cell-tower data identifying the loca-
tions from which Carpenter’s mobile phone placed and received calls 
over a four-month period that included the robberies at issue.680  The 
government had not obtained a search warrant for the call records, but 
the trial court denied Carpenter’s suppression motion.681 
The Fourth Amendment reads in relevant part: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”682  The question in  
Carpenter was not, however, whether it was unreasonable for the police 
to have searched call records for Carpenter’s mobile phone under the 
circumstances of the investigation.  The question, rather, was whether 
examining those records constituted a search at all.683 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 677 Both France and the United Kingdom have relied, through legislation, on somewhat analo-
gous requirements for healthcare providers raising conscience objections to performing abortions.  
See Douglas NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Conscience Wars in Transnational Perspective: Religious Lib-
erty, Third-Party Harm, and Pluralism, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE BAL-
ANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 187, 210 (Susanna Mancini & Michel 
Rosenfeld eds., 2018); The National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) Regula-
tions 2004, SI 2004/291, art. 16, ¶ 3(2)(e) (Eng.) (requiring “prompt referral to another provider of 
primary medical services who does not have such conscientious objections”); Loi 75-17 du 17 janvier 
1975 relative à l’interruption volontaire de la grossesse [Law 75-17 of January 17, 1975 Regarding 
the Voluntary Interruption of Pregnancy], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE 
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 18, 1975, p. 739, arts. L 162-3, L 162-8 (requiring 
objectors to supply names and addresses of alternative providers). 
 678 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (holding that police generally may not 
search digital contents of a cell phone seized at arrest); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 
(2013) (holding that police may generally take DNA swabs at arrest); United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012) (holding that attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s vehicle constitutes a 
search). 
 679 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018). 
 680 Id. 
 681 Id.   
 682 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 683 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–17. 
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That question might sound to lay ears as if the questioner is not an 
advanced English speaker, but before the Court’s decision in his favor, 
Fourth Amendment doctrine supplied some reason for skepticism about 
Carpenter’s argument.  A simple hypothetical tells us why.  Suppose 
Carpenter had contemporaneously told a friend where he was at the 
time of each robbery, and the police had put the friend on the witness 
stand.  A Fourth Amendment suppression motion would appear frivo-
lous under the circumstances.  Here, Carpenter gave his mobile carrier 
his locational data, and the carrier, like the hypothetical friend, then 
supplied it to police.684  As Justice Kennedy wrote (in dissent) of earlier 
cases involving documents in the hands of third parties: “The defend-
ants had no reason to believe the records were owned or controlled by 
them and so could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
records.”685 
Still, it is at least counterintuitive to suppose that the Constitution 
imposes no obligation — not even of reasonableness — on the behavior 
of police in this circumstance.  Most Americans carry cell phones and 
do not expect in doing so to have consented to unconstrained warrant-
less surveillance by the police.  Chief Justice Roberts noted for the ma-
jority “the seismic shifts in digital technology” that allow long-term 
tracking of everyone’s location.686  As Chief Justice Roberts wrote, 
“Sprint Corporation and its competitors are not your typical witnesses.  
Unlike the nosy neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they 
are ever alert, and their memory is nearly infallible.”687 
By now the reader has spotted the telltale distortions of rights as 
trumps: two opposite positions, both somehow obviously correct, pro-
ducing the standard bilateral rancor that a paradox of this sort reliably 
generates.  The Fourth Amendment states a standard — reasonable-
ness — but it is policed by rules that flatten the inquiry.688  Fourth 
Amendment doctrine draws a line between searches, which generally 
require probable cause and a warrant or else exclusion from trial, and 
nonsearches, which are generally free from constitutional constraint.689  
As Professor Anthony Amsterdam wrote nearly forty-five years ago, 
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 684 Id. at 2212. 
 685 Id. at 2228 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 686 Id. at 2219 (majority opinion). 
 687 Id. 
 688 See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (“[T]he definition of ‘reasona-
bleness’ turns, at least in part, on the more specific commands of the [Fourth Amendment’s] warrant 
clause.”). 
 689 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.  But see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (rejecting the idea 
that “the Fourth Amendment does not come into play” in cases that stop short of a “full-blown 
search”). 
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“this kind of all-or-nothing approach to the amendment puts extraordi-
nary strains upon the process of drawing its outer boundary lines.”690 
Since the consequence of labeling a warrantless intrusion a “search” 
is loss of the acquired evidence and its fruits,691 courts are understand-
ably reluctant to expand this category without introducing a patchwork 
of ad hoc exceptions.692  “It would obviously be easier and more likely 
for a court to say that a patrolman’s shining of a flashlight into the 
interior of a parked car was a ‘search,’” Amsterdam writes, “if that con-
clusion did not encumber the flashlight with a warrant requirement but 
simply required, for example, that the patrolman ‘be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts’ supporting a reasonable inference that 
something in the car required his attention.”693  This Term, in fact, in 
Collins v. Virginia,694 the Court invalidated a warrantless search of a 
motorcycle parked in a driveway that would have been nothing but good 
policing had the motorcycle been parked on the sidewalk in front of the 
house.695  Justice Alito, the lone dissenter, remarked that “[a]n ordinary 
person of common sense would react to the Court’s decision the way 
Mr. Bumble famously responded when told about a legal rule that did 
not comport with the reality of everyday life.  If that is the law, he ex-
claimed, ‘the law is a ass — a idiot.’”696  He’s not wrong. 
The third-party doctrine is likewise the sequela of a Fourth  
Amendment categoricalism that made Carpenter a difficult case.  The 
doctrine provides that “a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy 
in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”697  The Court 
has applied the doctrine, for example, to financial records given to 
banks,698 to a pen register placed by a telephone company to record the 
numbers a customer has dialed,699 and more generally, to observations 
of an individual’s public movements, including from the air.700  Qua 
rule, the third-party doctrine appears to be unique to the United 
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 690 Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 388. 
 691 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55 (1961); Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340–
41 (1939). 
 692 See Amar, supra note 38, at 757 (“Warrants are not required — unless they are.  All searches 
and seizures must be grounded in probable cause — but not on Tuesdays.”); Amsterdam, supra note 
39, at 349 (“For clarity and consistency, the law of the fourth amendment is not the Supreme Court’s 
most successful product.”). 
 693 Amsterdam, supra note 39, at 393 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). 
 694 138 S. Ct. 1663 (2018). 
 695 Id. at 1668; see also id. at 1680–81 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 696 Id. at 1681 (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 277 (1867)). 
 697 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979). 
 698 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).  
 699 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744. 
 700 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 
476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
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States.701  Not just that, but some jurisdictions have specifically and 
intentionally distanced themselves from U.S. case law in this area.702 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has become a jurisprudence of war-
rants instead of reasonableness.  There plainly are instances in which 
we want, and reasonably should want, police to effect searches or sei-
zures without a warrant, and so the approach has been to set off an 
endless series of exceptions for exigencies, border searches, consent, 
Terry703 stops, and so on.704  These exceptions are arbitrary, and they 
produce safe harbors that do not always match our intuitions, as in  
Carpenter.  We want the police to conduct certain kinds of warrantless 
searches sometimes but not always.  Proportionality jurisdictions tend 
to engage these weighty questions directly rather than load them onto a 
definitional frame that cannot bear their weight. 
There are areas of law in which a hard-edged rule is appropriate.705  
Maybe the cost of legal uncertainty is too high to bear.  Maybe we do 
not trust contextual judgment calls made by officers, judges, or jurors 
within certain contexts such as criminal justice.  The Fourth  
Amendment might be an area in which rules are necessary.  But in light 
of rapidly evolving surveillance technology, that judgment should be 
made with our eyes open to the relative costs and benefits.  Rights as 
trumps builds walls that obstruct our gaze. 
C.  The Gerrymandering Cases 
Partisan gerrymandering cases reflect the wages of crying wolf.706  A 
core theme of this Foreword has been that a constitutional court’s frame 
for rights adjudication should fit its paradigm rights cases.  The rights-
as-trumps frame might well suit a rights regime whose paradigm cases 
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 701 See Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data: A Com-
parative Analysis, in BULK COLLECTION: SYSTEMATIC GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO PRIVATE-
SECTOR DATA 5, 28–29 (Fred H. Cate & James X. Dempsey eds., 2017) (“The United States is more 
or less unique in affording no constitutional protection to third-party data . . . .”). 
 702 See, e.g., Dist. Registrar & Collector v. Canara Bank, (2005) 1 SCC 496, 519–23 (India); 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE COUNCIL OF EUR., THE RULE OF LAW ON THE IN-
TERNET AND IN THE WIDER DIGITAL WORLD § 4.4.3 at 91–92 (2014); Ruth Levush, Online 
Privacy Law: Israel, LAW.GOV (June 2012), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/online-privacy-law/2012/ 
israel.php [https://perma.cc/7W9B-5QRD] (translating the Israeli Attorney General’s 2007 Direc-
tives Regarding Transfer of Information from Telephone Companies to Bodies with Investigation 
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 703 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 704 See Amar, supra note 38, at 762–70. 
 705 See Jackson, supra note 114, at 3168 (suggesting that the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
and the First Amendment’s protections of freedom of speech and association are less suited to pro-
portionality analysis). 
 706 Cf. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 
(1973). 
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are pathological, where courts must defend the very existence of indi-
vidual rights against government bigotry, intolerance, or corruption.  
When, instead, the paradigm cases arise from the potential overreach or 
clumsiness of a government acting in good faith to solve actual social 
problems, rights adjudication must be sensitive to a democratic people’s 
first-order right to govern itself. 
For years, the constitutional discourse around partisan gerrymander-
ing has gotten it just backward.  This Term, the Court heard gerryman-
dering cases arising out of Maryland and Wisconsin, ultimately defer-
ring any merits decision in both on procedural grounds.707  In Maryland, 
Democratic Governor Martin O’Malley testified at trial that it was 
“clearly [his] intent” to help Democrats win, and another Democrat said 
one of the districts was redrawn to “minimize the voice of the  
Republicans.”708  The firm the Democrats hired to draw the district map 
was instructed only to devise one that “would produce a 7 to 1 congres-
sional delegation” and would protect “the six incumbent Democrats.”709  
Evidence in the Wisconsin case likewise revealed a process designed  
“to secure Republican control of the Assembly under any likely future 
electoral scenario for the remainder of the decade, in other words to 
entrench the Republican Party in power.”710 
A political party that constructs district lines intentionally to main-
tain its own partisan advantage is simply corrupt.  Its behavior falls 
squarely, almost comically, into the second paragraph of Carolene  
Products footnote four: “[L]egislation which restricts those political pro-
cesses which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of unde-
sirable legislation.”711  A legislature that deliberately tries to wall itself 
off from democratic change through the manipulation of district lines 
should forfeit that power, at least temporarily.  Courts that find racial 
gerrymandering or racial vote dilution routinely order that district lines 
be drawn by special masters.712  Such an order would be strong medicine 
in a partisan gerrymandering case, but willful constitutional violations 
call for strong remedies. 
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 707 Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1944 (2018) (holding that the balance of equities and the 
public interest tilted against plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction); Gill v. Whitford, 138 
S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (holding that plaintiffs failed to prove standing). 
 708 Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 817 (D. Md. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), aff’d, 
138 S. Ct. 1942. 
 709 Id. 
 710 Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 896 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded, 138 S. 
Ct. 1916; see also Richard Pildes, The Brazenness of Partisan Intent in the Court’s Gerrymandering 
Cases, ELECTION L. BLOG (May 15, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://electionlawblog.org/?p=99065 
[https://perma.cc/U5HC-6BDH] (referring to “bald evidence of partisan intent to manipulate the 
map” in Wisconsin). 
 711 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  
 712 Nathaniel Persily, When Judges Carve Democracies: A Primer on Court-Drawn Redistricting 
Plans, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1131, 1148 (2005).  
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Legalized partisan gerrymandering is unheard of in other mature de-
mocracies.713  That’s not because of happy pluralism; it’s because we’re 
wrong.  As all nine Justices affirmed in Vieth v. Jubelirer,714 the last 
partisan gerrymandering case to reach the Court before this Term, the 
practice is plainly undemocratic.715  The concerns expressed in Vieth 
and at oral argument in Gill v. Whitford716 (the Wisconsin case) and 
Benisek v. Lamone717 (the Maryland case) relate to the “manageability” 
of judicial intervention.718  Because all redistricting involves political 
choices, including the appropriate basis for political representation, it 
can be difficult for a court to say with confidence when a state legisla-
ture has ventured too far.  It should be clear by now that a court’s refusal 
to address an egregious rights violation based on concerns about  
hypothetical cases not before the court is just the kind of distortion that 
rights as trumps produces and that motivates this Foreword. 
But the problem runs deeper here because transparent partisan ger-
rymandering actually serves an illicit purpose.  Proportionality analysis 
would encourage the Court to be less concerned with articulating the 
boundaries of the right and more concerned with a purpose that aligns, 
negatively, with most Americans’ sense of political morality.  Manage- 
ability has less of a role to play when the government is acting in bad 
faith.  The Court’s obvious avoidance strategy in Gill and Benisek is 
propelled by concerns that do not match the nature of the government’s 
behavior.  The Court’s decision in Trump v. Hawaii,719 in which it up-
held the President’s entry restrictions on nationals from certain predom-
inantly Muslim countries, likewise leaned on the need for political def-
erence — authority over justification — without sufficient attention to 
transparent religious bigotry on the part of the Executive.720  Rights as 
trumps is born of what Professor Judith Shklar calls the “liberalism of 
fear,”721 but it can quickly lose its resolve on contact with the real world. 
Fear of manageability should, by contrast, be a crucial consideration 
when rights adjudication obstructs the efforts of the political branches 
to address genuine social problems.  It should have been a major concern 
in cases such as Citizens United, Parents Involved, and Shelby 
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 713 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 769, 789–
90 (2013). 
 714 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 715 Id. at 292 (plurality opinion). 
 716 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018). 
 717 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018). 
 718 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (plurality opinion) (“[N]o judicially discernible and manageable 
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 719 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
 720 See id. at 2435–40 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 721 See SHKLAR, supra note 453, at 237. 
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County.722  The absence of a discourse of manageability from those cases 
reflects the Court’s misplaced view that what triggers the need for ag-
gressive remediation is the identity of the right invoked rather than the 
egregiousness of the government’s actual behavior.  The ongoing search 
for First Amendment language with which to state the objection to ger-
rymandering reflects this orientation.723 
The Court’s approach to reapportionment further exacerbates the 
problem.  There, the Court has applied exacting scrutiny to any depar-
ture from mathematical equality in congressional districting and to pop-
ulation differences of at least ten percent in state legislative district-
ing.724  Treating one person, one vote as a trump has made it a 
problematic comparator in other cases implicating the districting pro-
cess.725  It has lulled the Court into associating review of political pa-
thologies with administrable remedies rather than addressing the  
pathology itself. 
An alternative approach to both gerrymandering and apportionment 
cases would be to pathologize intentional vote dilution in much the way 
the Brown Court pathologized racial segregation.  No serious democratic 
concern inheres in districts failing to achieve precise mathematical 
equality.  There are many potential bases for representation apart from 
individual persons,726 and the census is itself an approximation that de-
teriorates in quality over the course of a decade.  Malapportionment and 
partisan gerrymandering become democratic problems, rather, when 
they serve purely partisan or self-interested ends.727  Districts that follow 
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 722 In Shelby County, the “rights” were those of states.  570 U.S. 529, 543–44 (2013). 
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traditional municipal boundaries but are (to a point) unequal in size 
should be much preferred to those that are motivated by partisan en-
trenchment but are precisely equal numerically. 
The susceptibility of malapportionment to a trumping rule of the sort 
the Court has been grasping for just means that bad actors dilute votes 
by gerrymandering instead of by creating unequal districts.  As in other 
areas, proportionality analysis would help to shift the Court’s gaze away 
from the particular abstracted right at stake — whether grounded in the 
Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, or elsewhere — and to-
ward the government’s actual behavior and motivations.  When a legis-
lator or governor tells you he is trying to alter district lines in order to 
make it more difficult for his political opponents to win elections, there 
is no need for sociological gobbledygook.728  This wolf comes as a 
wolf.729 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Lenin had a point when (it is claimed) he said liberty is “so precious 
that it must be rationed.”730  Too many individual claims of liberty 
would “court anarchy,”731 and so a functioning state must either restrict 
the number of such claims or limit what follows from them.  This  
Foreword has argued that the latter course fits constitutional adjudica-
tion in a mature democracy whose citizens experience themselves as 
rights-bearers but who nonetheless must cohabit a working ecosystem.  
If rights are trumps, we had better be sure we get them right.  But we 
can’t be sure, and it is costly to pretend that we are. 
We live in interesting times, beset with challenges, but they are dif-
ferent from those of our forebears.  The core case is no longer to defend 
downtrodden groups from organized oppression by the state, even as 
much of that work remains.732  Increasingly, as Madison foresaw, we are 
called upon to defend the state against permanent capture by self- 
interested factions.  Having more or less resolved basic normative ques-
tions of political participation, we must now construct a politics to go 
with it. 
When this chapter of the nation’s history is written, what will be 
said of our constitutional law?  The Constitution’s endurance motivates 
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its resistance to new technologies of rights adjudication, but that endur-
ance is itself underwritten by constitutional law’s amenability to change.  
Our constitutional tradition has resisted calls to adhere to the past for 
its own sake.  It has resisted calls for a stubborn parochialism that ig-
nores the lessons of others around the world who face similar social, 
political, and legal challenges.  The latest challenge is for us to see, hear, 
speak to, and live with one another, and courts must find their place in 
surmounting it.  Judges are imperfect, but they are better suited than 
others to view rights conflicts from a distance, to investigate the truth, 
and to resolve such controversies respectfully, without fear or favor.733 
Constitutional law may fail us yet, but it carries within its name an 
implicit, and poignant, promise to the people it serves.  Now is the time 
for redemption. 
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